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Abstract: Over the past two decades, corporate governance reforms have
emerged as a central focus of corporate law in countries across the development
spectrum. Various legal scholars studying these reform efforts have engaged in
a vigorous debate about whether globalization will lead to convergence of
corporate governance laws toward one model of governance: namely the Anglo-
American, dispersed shareholder model, or whether existing national
characteristics will thwart convergence. Despite rapid economic growth and
reforms in developing countries such as India, the legal literature discussing
this debate primarily focuses on developed economies.
This Article examines recent corporate governance reforms in India as a case
study for evaluating the competing claims on global convergence of corporate
governance standards currently polarizing the field of corporate law. This
Article seeks to make a fresh contribution to the convergence debate by
examining the implications of India 's corporate governance reform efforts. It
contends that the Indian experience demonstrates that traditional theories
predicting convergence, or a lack thereof fail to fully capture the trajectory of
actual corporate governance reforms. India's reform efforts demonstrate that
while corporate governance rules may converge on a formal level with Anglo-
American corporate governance norms, local characteristics tend to prevent
reforms from being more than merely formal. India's inability to effectively
implement and enforce its extensive new rules corroborates the argument that
comprehensive convergence is limited, and that the transmission of ideas from
one system to another is highly complex and difficult, requiring political, social
and institutional changes that cannot be made easily.
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Over the past two decades, countries across the development spectrum
have instituted corporate governance reforms. These reforms have been
propelled both by corporate scandals and a greater global focus on
corporate governance. While corporate governance reforms have long been
a central issue in developed economies, developing economies are
increasingly playing major roles in the corporate governance arena.
One result of these corporate governance reforms around the world has
been the emergence of a vigorous debate about the scope and nature of
different corporate governance standards.1 A key portion of this debate
concerns whether globalization will lead to convergence of corporate
governance laws toward one model of governance. Proponents of the
convergence theory generally argue that corporate governance laws are
converging around the shareholder-oriented Anglo-American model, in part
because they view this model as most efficient.2  Others argue that the
Anglo-American model has not been widely adopted for a variety of
reasons, including that existing governance systems are not easily changed
due to path dependent choices-i.e., that past or traditional practices tend to
persist even if better alternatives are available, or, more broadly, that
"history matters."
' 3
A wealth of literature has been written in the finance field addressing
convergence both generally and with a focus on country-specific case
studies from a variety of economies, including numerous emerging
1 See, e.g., CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
2 See, e.g., Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 157, 172 (Reinier
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) (stating that regulation of control transactions is "a timely
reminder that 'Anglo-American' company law is not the unity that is sometimes assumed");
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistory for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439 (2001); see also Darryl Reed, Corporate Governance Reforms in Developing Countries,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC REFORMS, AND DEVELOPMENT 10 (Darryl Reed &
Sanjoy Mukherjee eds., 2004). However, there is some debate as to whether a standardized
Anglo-American model of corporate law even exists. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Who
Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US. and U.K.
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007).
3 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds.,
2004) (explaining that, as opposed to the systemic convergence model of corporate
governance, some systemic persistence scholars are "skeptical that corporate governance and
ownership structures have converged thus far, and they argue that structural imperatives help
to explain why differences have persisted thus far, despite convergence in many economic
areas.").
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economics. 4 In contrast, the legal literature analyzing specific corporate
governance reforms in emerging economies is fairly limited.5 For example,
in their comparative study of corporate law, Professor Reinier Kraakman
and other renowned corporate law scholars focus on developed economies
to the exclusion of corporate law in emerging economies. 6 This dearth of
analysis is unfortunate because an examination of emerging legal norms in
developing economies can enrich and enlighten the convergence debate. At
a minimum, careful study of governance reforms in developing countries
can help us determine whether the Anglo-American model is replicable-
that is, whether there can be global convergence towards the Anglo-
American model. Illuminating the path and results of corporate governance
reforms in a country like India provides important lessons for reform efforts
in other countries.
This Article aims to address this gap. It explores the recent wave of
corporate governance reforms in India as a case study for evaluating and
exploring the corporate governance convergence debate. Using the Indian
4 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998);
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3
(2000) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Corporate Governance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2001); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants]; Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006);
Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why Do Countries Matter So Much for
Corporate Governance?, (ECGI-Finance, Working Paper No. 50/2004, November 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580883.
5 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson &
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate
Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (2005); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Company Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
Comparative studies of corporate governance convergence in developing or emerging
economies are fairly preliminary. See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara, A Race to the Top:
International Regulatory Reform Post Sarbanes-Oxley, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (2006).
6 See David A. Skeel Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1522 (May
2004) (reviewing THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 2). While acknowledging
that his casebook excludes a study of corporate governance in most developing economies,
Professor Backer also notes that "[o]ther systems of corporate governance are also worthy of
study. The governance systems of Latin America, the Indian subcontinent and Africa merit
discussion in their own right." LARRY CATA BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW:
UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, CHINA AND JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS xxxvii, n.2
(2002). Similarly, in their recent book "Convergence and Persistence in Corporate
Governance," Professors Gordon and Roe recognize that "corporate governance is on the
reform agenda all over the world," Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004), but the focus of much of the comparative analysis in their work
remains on developed economies. See CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE, supra note 1.
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context, this Article argues that the trajectory and results of corporate
governance reforms in India demonstrate that extensive governance reforms
can converge on a formal level to a considerable extent with traditional
notions of the Anglo-American model. Nevertheless, lapses in the
enforcement and widespread implementation of these rules reveal that
India's corporate governance reform efforts, at least on the ground, show a
lack of comprehensive convergence to the Anglo-American model. India's
inability to effectively implement and enforce its robust new rules
corroborates the argument that comprehensive convergence is limited and
that the transmission of ideas from one system to another is highly complex
and difficult, requiring political, social, and institutional changes that
cannot be made easily. This Article contends that the Indian experience
demonstrates that traditional theories predicting convergence, or a lack
thereof, fail to fully capture the trajectory of actual corporate governance
reforms. Rather, this Article argues that, as demonstrated by the Indian
reform experience, a mixed system of governance can emerge and corporate
governance reforms can be better understood through a view of
convergence as a continuum.
India is, for a number of reasons, a particularly useful case study for
analyzing the competing claims of the convergence debate. If complete
convergence to the Anglo-American model could occur in a developing
economy, India would be the perfect testing ground. India has experienced
exponential economic growth in the past decade, striving to become a
global economic leader. This growth has resulted in a transformation of
Indian companies, with significant demand for new capital.7 The largest
Indian companies are striving to be global corporate actors and have
attempted to access capital markets both inside and outside of India. 8
Institutional investors, including foreign institutional investors, are making
inroads in the ownership of Indian firms. 9  Moreover, the Indian
government has increasingly opened up the economy to foreign direct
7 See Pratip Kar, Corporate Governance in India, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 249, 251, 272-73 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. Ed.,
2001).
8 See TARUN KHANNA, BILLIONS OF ENTREPRENEURS: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE
RESHAPING THEIR FUTURE AND YOURS (2007). India's capital markets have experienced a
surge of initial public offerings (IPOs). According to Thomson Financial, Indian companies
expect to raise over $14 billion in the first half of 2008, compared with $4.6 billion in the
same period in 2007. See Power Play, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cftn?story-id=10534942; Orit Gadiesh &
Sri Rajan, Looking at Acquisitive India: An M&A Scorecard, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2609678.cms.
9 Pitibas Mohanty, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in India, (2003)
(unnumbered working paper), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public
/documents/APCITY/UNPAN023823.pdf.
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investment (FDI).' 0
The needs of India's expanding economy, including access to FDI, the
increased presence of institutional investors (both domestic and foreign) in
India, and the growing desire of Indian companies to access global capital
markets by gaining listing on stock exchanges outside of India, have
spurred corporate governance reforms." Thus, India's rapid economic
transformation has been accompanied by significant reforms in its corporate
governance laws. Beginning in the late 1990s, the Securities and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI), the primary regulatory authority for India's capital
markets, formed a number of committees to help formulate corporate
governance standards for publicly listed Indian companies. After lobbying
by large firms and a governance code proposed by a leading industry group,
in 2000, SEBI introduced unprecedented corporate governance reforms via
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement 12 of Stock Exchanges (Clause 49). 13
These reforms were phased in over several years, and now apply to
thousands of listed Indian public companies.
Clause 49, which has been described as a "watershed event in Indian
corporate governance," established a number of corporate governance
requirements with a focus on corporate boards and disclosure to
shareholders.' 4 The main components of Clause 49 are summarized in the
Appendix. Many of its provisions-such as a minimum number of
independent directors, independent audit committees, and CEO/CFO
certification of financial statements, internal controls and disclosure with
respect to governance matters-were derived from governance reforms
adopted in developed countries, especially those in the United States and
the United Kingdom. On the surface, Clause 49 thus moved India toward
formal convergence to the Anglo-American model. However, Indian
regulators have been less successful in implementing and enforcing Clause
49's extensive standards than in establishing them. Despite much fanfare
10 After decades of prohibitive policies on FDI, India's current "foreign investment
policy.., is approximately as open as that of China." ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE
EMERGING GIANT 107 (2008).
1 See Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms
Increase Firms' Market Value: Evidence from India 9 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Olin
Working Paper No. 07-002, Oct. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914440.
12 The Listing Agreement with stock exchanges defines the rules and processes that
companies must follow in order to remain listed companies on an Indian stock exchange.
See Black & Khanna, supra note 11, at 9.
13 CIRCULAR, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BD. OF INDIA, AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 49 OF
THE LISTING AGREEMENT (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://web.sebi.gov.in/circulars
/2000/CIR422000.html (reporting changes in response to Birla Report); CIRCULAR,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED COMPANIES-CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT
(Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://web.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2003/cir2803.html [hereinafter
CLAUSE 49 (2003)] (reporting changes in response to Murthy Report).
14 Black & Khanna, supra note, 11 at 5.
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and threats of vigorous enforcement, Indian regulators have not yet instilled
Clause 49's corporate governance across corporate India. 
15
This Article argues that path dependent forces in India's political,
economic, and social framework have created a corporate governance
environment that only formally mirrors Anglo-American governance
principles. These forces include the lack of an effective regulator, the
inability of shareholders to effectively enforce corporate law through the
judiciary, the complex concentrated ownership structures of Indian firms,
and political pressures related to government ownership of certain major
industries.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I presents a brief overview
of corporate governance convergence. This section examines the two
leading models of corporate governance and outlines the debate about
convergence in the corporate governance context.
Part II first offers a brief overview of the political economy of India
designed to familiarize the reader with the country's recent economic
transformation. Part II then presents a summary of India's legal tradition as
well as the legislative and regulatory framework applicable to public
companies in India. It also discusses the traditional ownership structures of
Indian firms.
Part III explores India's recent corporate governance reforms. It
examines India's regulatory reforms and demonstrates that India's
governance rules resemble and are largely derived from recent corporate
governance reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed,
India's reforms illustrate that convergence to the Anglo-American model of
corporate governance has occurred at a formal level. Part III then takes a
deeper look at corporate governance reforms in India and establishes that
formal convergence has not led to substantive convergence. To illustrate
the weaknesses in India's corporate governance regime, Part III examines
recent flawed efforts to implement and enforce Clause 49.
In Part IV, this Article argues that these weaknesses will persist
because they have been shaped by unique political and social forces. These
forces include the traditional closed ownership structures of Indian firms, an
ineffective institutional framework to support enforcement efforts,
weaknesses in the judiciary, and political pressures related to government
ownership of certain industries. These weaknesses suggest that corporate
15 At the end of 2008, India experienced a massive corporate governance scandal
involving Satyam Computer Services, one of India's largest technology companies. See
James Fontanella-Khan, Timeline: The Satyam Scandal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24261 f70-dcab- 1 dd-a2a9-000077b07658.html. The Satyam
scandal has been described as India's Enron. See India's Enron, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12898777. It
remains to be seen whether the massive fraud at Satyam is an aberration or a sign of greater
systemic problems.
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governance in India may be unable to move past merely a formal level of
convergence, and at the least, the rate of convergence from formal to
comprehensive will be impeded. This Part concludes with a discussion of
the implications of India's corporate governance experience for the
convergence debate.
I. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGENCE DEBATE
A. Comparative Corporate Governance: A Brief Overview
Corporate governance is broadly defined as "a set of relationships
between a company's board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders."' 6 A
narrower view that has traditionally influenced corporate law and
governance standards defines corporate governance as "the ways in which
suppliers of finance to the corporation assure themselves return on their
investment."' 17 According to this view, the corporate entity is a means by
which investors and managers allocate rights and responsibilities. ' 8 Thus,
in keeping with this latter view of the corporation, corporate law and
corporate governance standards primarily address the agency costs that
arise as a result of the divergence of interests between managers and owners
(shareholders).' 9 In order to reduce agency costs, corporate governance
rules broadly address, among other matters, powers, structures, and
relationships among various participants in the corporate entity, namely the
board, shareholders, and managers. Given this concern with ownership and
principal-agent issues, a central focus of corporate governance rules has
been the structure and role of the corporate board.
Contemporary scholarship regarding corporate governance generally
identifies and studies two distinct corporate governance regimes. In what
has been termed as a regime of "closed governance," corporations have
concentrated ownership with controlling shareholders, such as the state,
financial institutions, or wealthy family groups, who maintain power over
the firm's managers. In contrast, an open ownership regime or dispersed
ownership model features arm's length relationships between shareholders
16 OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1999).
17 Andrei Shleifer et al., A Survey of Corporate Governance, J. FIN. 737, 773 (1997).
18 THOMAS W. Joo, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 3 (2004). The
classic work of Berle and Means highlighted the agency problems inherent in the separation
of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers). See ADOLPH BERLE & GARDNER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6-7 (rev. ed. 1968). Berle and
Means found an inherent potential for a conflict of interest between the owners of a limited
liability company (often small and dispersed) and its paid managers. Managers should act in
the interest of owners and in the most economically efficient way, but often do not (the
"agency conflict" problem) because they do not always reap the profits of such actions. Id.
at 115.
19 Joo, supra note 18, at 3.
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and managers.20  This dispersed ownership model is also shaped by the
shareholder primacy norm. Companies in countries with a concentrated
ownership model rely heavily on controlling shareholders for financing the
firm and monitoring the managers, while those in the dispersed ownership
model rely on market financing and liquidity.2 2 The open regime is said to
prevail in the Anglo-American economies of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland, while the closed governance regime persists in much
of the rest of the world, including the continental European economies and
Japan. 
23
B. The Convergence Debate in Corporate Governance
A vast academic inquiry has emerged, particularly at the intersection
of law and economics, regarding whether globalization and increasing
financial integration have led to convergence of corporate governance
24
standards across countries. Numerous scholars have studied the
20 Corporate forms in common law countries, such as the U.K. and the U.S., are often
defined as "shareholder-oriented" because of their focus on shareholders' interests. For
greater discussion of the characteristics of the shareholder-oriented model, see Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 468.
21 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to
Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM J. EUR. L. 219, 219 (1999). But see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW 45, 45 (2002) (challenging the assumption made in the convergence
debate that the U.S. model is based on shareholder primacy, and arguing that the U.S. model
is more accurately a director primacy model); Dan Puchniak, The Japanization of American
Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History for Corporate Law, 9
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 7, 11-12 (2007).
22 Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance,
23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 477, 480 (2005).
23 This Article grapples only with whether corporate governance convergence has
occurred in a developing country, namely India; it does not address the debate regarding
whether corporate governance reforms, and in particular the Anglo-American model of
governance and a common law system, affect capital markets development. There is
considerable empirical research that attempts to determine the legal systems, pre-conditions
and legal reforms necessary for development of robust capital markets. Some of this
research suggests that countries with stringent laws that protect investors with proper
enforcement have enormous capital market benefits-their markets are larger and deeper,
with firms having better access to external financing on better terms. See, e.g., Doidge et al.,
supra note 4; La Porta et al., Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1161; La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants, supra note 4, at 1138. Undoubtedly, there remains a vigorous debate
about the complex relationship between good governance and economic growth. See Troy
A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S.
Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004).
24 For an overview of the convergence debate, see CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE,
supra note 1; Pinto, supra note 22; see also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery,
Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global
Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law
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differences between corporate governance structures of civil law and
common law systems around the world.25  These scholars argue that
different corporate governance regimes have been competing for
dominance. Therefore, much of the corporate governance convergence
debate has revolved around which of the two different models of corporate
forms, the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model or the
stakeholder-oriented/concentrated ownership model, has triumphed or will
triumph.
Most convergence theory scholars advance the primacy of the Anglo-
American model of governance, arguing that this model is the "endpoint of
an evolutionary development" and is "both desirable and inevitable., 26
They contend that a global consensus of shareholder primacy is
developing.27 These scholars further suggest that convergence to the
Anglo-American model will benefit countries and companies. They assert
that, given globalization and the increased interdependence of financial
markets around the world, some level of uniformity and convergence would
promote the global competitiveness of firms.2 8
Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459 (2001); John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 642
(1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 336 (2001); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and
Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance: Which Model of
Capitalism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833 (1998).
25 See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,
471-72 (1999); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999);
Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 149, 203 (2001).
26 Coffee, supra note 24, at 705-07 ("Those firms seeking to grow in size to a global
scale are likely to elect into the 'higher' governance standards already largely observed in
the United States, and such bonding should minimize the social friction and even unrest that
formal convergence could cause .... ); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 443
("[W]e are witnessing rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented model."). See
also Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to
Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 6 (1999) ("Movement towards a
worldwide capital market could in turn have a substantial impact on corporate governance in
individual countries."); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1145-46
(1999) ("[C]ountries have sought to improve their corporate governance structures by
implementing the best policies from around the world."); Edward B. Rock, America's
Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 367, 388
(1996) (championing competition among international corporate governance structures).
27 See Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L
983,985-90 (2005).
28 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 450-51:
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However, there are a number of opponents of the convergence theory.
Some opponents argue that not only is there a lack of convergence toward a
shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model, but that theories of
convergence reflect U.S. economic imperialism. 29 Other opponents, most
notably Professors Roe and Bebchuk, argue that such convergence is not
possible because "path dependency" creates significant obstacles to
convergence. 30  As Professor Coffee articulated, path dependence theory
argues that "history matters, because it constrains the way in which
institutions can change, and efficiency does not necessarily triumph."'
Professors Coffee and Gilson have made important contributions to the
above debates. Instead of arguing that full convergence to the Anglo-
American model has occurred or will occur, Professors Gilson and Coffee
classify three different levels of convergence that have been observed under
various legal regimes: functional convergence, formal convergence, and
convergence by contract.32 Functional convergence can occur when
existing governance institutions are flexible enough to respond to the
demands of changed circumstances without altering the institutions' formal
characteristics.33 Formal convergence, on the other hand, occurs when an
effective response requires legislative action to alter the basic structure of
existing governance institutions.34  Convergence by contract may arise
The increasing internationalization of both product and financial markets has
brought individual firms... into direct competition. It is now widely thought that
firms organized and operated according to the shareholder-oriented model have
had the upper hand ... [and] can be expected to have important competitive
advantages over firms adhering more closely to other models. These advantages
include access to equity capital at lower cost (including, conspicuously, start-up
capital), more aggressive development of new product markets, stronger incentives
to reorganize along lines that are managerially coherent, and more rapid
abandonment of inefficient investments.
29 See generally Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global"
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 330-36 (2001) (arguing
that convergence is not taking place and that the world might be experiencing several
backlashes against the prospect of a Lex Americana); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins:
Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 195 (2004).
30 See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 25, at 135-36 (noting that forces exist to spur
convergence but have been unable to overcome the historically developed, and differing,
corporate governance structures); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1145,1146, 1148 n. 11 (1998).
31 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, 111 YALE L.J. 1,4 (2001).
32 See Coffee, supra note 24; Gilson, supra note 24.
33 For discussions of "functional convergence," see THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 2, at 4; Gilson, supra note 24.
34 Gilson, supra note 24, at 336.
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when existing governance institutions lack the flexibility to respond without
formal change, and political barriers restrict the capacity for formal
institutional change.
More recently, some scholars have begun to recognize a middle
ground between the two opposing sides of the convergence debate. These
scholars argue that corporate governance models cannot be exported merely
by changes in formal laws, and that recognizing the forces of the local
culture is necessary for effective corporate governance.36 According to
Professor Pistor, "a simple convergence story does not do justice to the
complexity of legal change. 3 7 However, that is not to state that formal
legal changes are not occurring and are not important. These scholars
differentiate between de facto and de jure convergence, i.e., between
adoption of similar corporate governance laws and actual corporate
governance practices.
38
Put simply, nations may formally adopt corporate governance
systems that look like those elsewhere, but the acceptance of the
enshrined principles may significantly lag their codification. This
35 Contractual convergence can occur through "corporate migration" and "securities
market integration." See Coffee, supra note 24, at 653. Corporate migration occurs when a
firm's securities are cross-listed on another country's securities exchange. For example, by
listing on a U.S. securities exchange, foreign companies agree to comply with its corporate
governance requirements, such as maintaining a minimum number of independent directors
and an audit committee, as well as U.S. securities regulations that have corporate governance
implications. See John C. Coffee Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-
Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002). Some studies have found that this cross-listing generally leads
to an increase in a firm's share price in significant part as a result of compliance by cross-
listed companies with more rigorous disclosure and governance standards. See Mark H.
Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in
the U.S. Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, J.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH (forthcoming); Doidge et al., supra note 4. But see Kate Litvak,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857 (2007) (arguing
that the bonding premium for firms cross-listed in the United States declines with the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley).
36 See generally Bernard S. Black et al., Final Report and Legal Reform
Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 546
(2001); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 24; Paredes, supra
note 23; Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. OF
TRANSITION 325 (2000).
37 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in
Transition Economies 46 (Eur. Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Working Paper No. 49,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=214654.
38 See Krishna Palepu, Tarun Khanna & Joseph Kogan, Globalization and Similarities in
Corporate Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis 6 (Harvard NOM, Working Paper No.
02-31; Strategy Unit, Working Paper No. 02-041; Harvard Business School, Working Paper
No. 02-041, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=323621.
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may be for several reasons including a lack of understanding of what
is implied by good corporate governance, absence of complementary
institutions needed to implement the principles, or simply poor
enforcement.39
These arguments are thus consistent with theories of path dependence in
that they recognize the impact of local socioeconomic conditions, politics,
and the legal system on corporate law .40 These forces may prevent changes
in the form of corporate law from effecting significant change in a country's
overall governance scheme.
This new trend in the convergence debate better captures the reality of
corporate governance convergence in action. While these studies have been
ground-breaking, much of the world, and particularly the most recent wave
of reforms, have yet to be fully studied. Surprisingly little attention has
been paid to corporate governance reforms in recently emerging economies,
particularly India. 41  This Article seeks to fill this gap by discussing
whether corporate governance convergence has occurred or will occur in a
developing economy such as India.
II. INDIA: AN OVERVIEW
India is, for a number of reasons, a particularly appropriate case study
for examining convergence in a developing country. If full convergence to
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance could occur in a
developing economy, India would be the perfect testing ground. As a
former British colony, Indian corporate law has historical ties to British
corporate law. Moreover, after forty years of failed socialist policies, in the
1990s Indian leaders strongly advocated economic liberalization and a
move toward an Anglo-American model of corporate law.42
The early 1990s was a period of extensive reform in India's economy
and corporate legal regime. Not only were economic liberalization policies
implemented, but new legal institutions were established to implement new
rules in India's corporate and securities laws. These new regulatory
institutions have been the primary avenue for producing new corporate
39 Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
40 Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791,864 (2002).
41 See Naomi Cahn, Corporate Governance Divergence and Sub-Saharan Africa:
Lessons from Out Here in the Fields, 33 STETSON L. REv. 893, 898 (2004).
42 See Ananya Mukherjee Reed, Corporate Governance in India, 37 J. Bus. ETHICS 249,
249 (2002); Diganta Mukherjee & Tejamoy Gosh, An Analysis of Corporate Performance
and Governance in India: Study of Some Selected Industries 6 (Indian Statistical Inst., Delhi
Planning Unit, Discussion Paper No. 04-19, 2004), available at http://www.isid.ac.in
/--planning/workingpapers/dp04-19.pdf.
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governance standards.43
This section briefly traces recent developments in India's economy and
the resulting need for capital which has led to a growth in India's capital
markets. It goes on to present an overview of India's corporate and
securities laws, as well as the institutions responsible for drafting and
implementing these laws, and considers how the roles of these institutions
may affect the way in which corporate governance standards are enforced.
Finally, this section discusses the traditional ownership structure of Indian
firms. This section argues that the traditional ownership structure of Indian
firms, as well as decades of socialist economic policies, help explain why
corporate governance rules were largely undeveloped until the passage of
Clause 49 in 2001.
A. India's Economic and Stock Market Growth
1. Economic Growth and the Need to Attract Capital
India gained its independence from British rule in 1947 and has since
become the world's largest democracy. More recently, particularly in the
past decade, India has been hailed as an "emerging giant," due to its
economic growth, with some analysts going so far as to predict that
between 2015 and 2050 India's GDP growth rate "would exceed that of all
other major countries in the world, including China., 44
Despite recent economic growth, India's economy has not followed a
smooth growth path since independence.4  During much of the post-
independence period, India's economy was saddled with socialist policies
that led to the slow growth rate often called the "Hindu rate of growth. 46
India's post-independence leaders attempted to insulate the country from
economic shocks through state control and intervention. Their economic
development strategy was inward-looking and included centralized
planning, complex industrial licensing requirements, nationalization of
banks, substantial public ownership of heavy industry, high tariff barriers,
tight restriction on the operations of foreign firms and on imports and
exports, and high bureaucratic control.4 7
Significant economic reforms in India since the early 1990s have led to
43 John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India 2 (ECGI-
Law, Working Paper No. 107/2008, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1116608.
44 See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at xv. For a comprehensive chronicle of the history
of economic policy in India since independence in 1947, see id.
45 Jos MooIJ, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN INDIA 19 (2005).
46 See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 16.
47 See id. at xvii, 47-77.
Corporate Governance Convergence
29:335 (2009)
a transformation of the Indian economy.48 Following a balance of
payments crisis that came to a head in 1991, Dr. Manmohan Singh-the
Finance Minister in the early 1990s and India's current Prime Minister-
guided the government through a process of systematic economic reforms,
marking a radical departure from over forty years of socialist-inspired
government planning. 49  Such reforms were continued by other
administrations in the 1990s, furthering economic liberalization by opening
the economy to foreign and direct competition and introducing significant
privatization of various public sector enterprises.50
The results of these economic reforms have been impressive. The
growth of India's GDP has averaged about six percent since 1991 and
around eight percent in the past three to four years, making India, along
with China, one of the fastest growing countries in the world. The Indian
economy is now "characterized by an acceleration of growth in GDP,
foreign trade, and foreign investment.
5 2
Economic growth and the accompanying need for capital have led to
large changes in the business of Indian companies. For example, since
2000, Indian companies, particularly those in the pharmaceutical and
computer services industries, have been on an acquisition spree abroad.53
More importantly, the largest Indian companies are striving to be global
corporate actors and have sought access to global capital markets. In the
first half of 2006 Indian companies accounted for almost a third of new
issuances of depositary receipts globally. 
54
Some Indian firms have attempted to access capital by listing abroad.
However, despite the initial push toward foreign listing, relatively few
Indian companies have listed in the United States or the United Kingdom.
48 In the 1980s, the government made some tentative moves towards economic
liberalization, although most of the government's reform policies were piecemeal and
uncoordinated. See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 78-94.
49 See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 100-03.
5o See MooIJ, supra note 45, at 19-22.
"' See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 259; see also India on Fire, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3,
2007. While this growth has been impressive, there is concern that India's economy may be
"overheating" and that such growth cannot be sustained without major reforms and
investment by the government in the public sector. Id. See also India Overheats,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007.
52 PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 108.
53 In the first quarter of 2007, Indian firms announced 34 acquisitions of non-Indian firms
worth more than $10.7 billion, and in 2006, such acquisitions totaled $23 billion. Marauding
Maharajas, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2007 ("With GDP growth averaging 8%... Indian firms
have been minting money in the past three years. Their average profit margins are around
10% .... 60% of India's 200 leading companies are looking to invest this loot in foreign
purchases.").
54 See Rajesh Chakrabarti, William Megginson & Pradeep K. Yadav, Corporate
Governance in India, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 59 (2008).
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While thousands of companies are listed on the Indian stock exchanges,
only about fifty Indian firms have listed in the United Kingdom. 55
Similarly, Indian companies are still in the early stages of experimenting
with U.S. capital markets. The process of listing in the U.S. began with
Infosys, a leading Indian technology company, listing on the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) in the
United States in 1998 and was followed by the listing of other Indian
companies, most in the technology sector.56 While thousands of companies
are listed on the Indian stock exchanges, only a handful of those companies
trade in the United States as ADRs; 57 only twelve are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 58 and three on NASDAQ.5 9
After some of corporate India's successful listings abroad, Indian
regulators and leading companies argued that good corporate governance
and internationally accepted standards of accounting and disclosure could
help them access capital, particularly foreign capital. The desire to raise
capital has been cited as a leading driver of the support for corporate
governance reforms by India's corporate leaders. 60 In fact, "firms appear to
have been motivated in large part by the desire to gain A reater access to
capital, and especially to foreign institutional investment."
55 See Press Release, London Stock Exchange, Four Indian Firms Take AIM in Four
Weeks (June 10, 2008), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/exeres
/ADCOE3E6-3EE3-45DA-91E9-B7D58C2F5CE9.htm; see also Press Release, London
Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange Markets Opened by Indian Finance Minister (Feb.
4, 2005), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about!Newsroom
/pressreleases/2005/040205india.htm (stating that "India is one of the [London] Exchange's
three key priority markets for attracting international listings alongside China and Russia.").
56 Infosys has been at the forefront of India's rapidly expanding information technology
(IT) industry. Revenues from the IT industry constitute approximately 5.4% of India's gross
domestic product and have grown at the rate of almost 30% since 1997. Gravity's Pull,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2007.
57 American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are securities a non-U.S. company that seeks to
list on a U.S. stock exchange offers. An ADR is essentially a receipt that is issued by a U.S.
depositary bank and is backed by the company's shares which are held by the bank. Because
ADRs are quoted in U.S. dollars and trade just like any other stock, they make it simple for
investors to diversify their holdings internationally. See NYSE-Glossary,
http://www.nyse.com/glossary/Glossary.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
" Ruth David, NYSE Buys into India, FORBES, Jan. 10, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/01/1 0/india-nyse-goldman-markets-emerge-cx rd 110
markets0l.html.
59 Nasdaq Looks at Indian Mid-Cap Cos' Listing, HINDU Bus. LINE, Feb. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.blonnet.com/2004/02/08/stories/2004020801500300.htm.
60 Balan N. Balasubramanian, Vikramaditya S. Khanna & Bernard S. Black, Firm-level
Corporate Governance: A Case Study of India, at 5 (U. of Tex. Law, Law and Econ.
Research Paper No. 87, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-995650.
61 Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Governance,
Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India 31 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Olin
Working Paper No. 08-005, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 105732.
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This need for capital may explain the leading role of large corporations
and industry groups in pushing for tough new corporate governance
standards. 62 Large corporations in India have been instrumental in leading
the path toward formal corporate governance changes in India. They have
argued that sustaining India's economic growth requires attracting portfolio
investors, including Western institutional investors.63 For example, in
public statements arid speeches, leaders of Infosys, a major player in the
corporate governance campaign both inside and outside of India, have
repeatedly pushed for governance reforms in India, arguing that such
reforms will attract foreign investors and allow Indian companies to raise
capital. 64
2. India's Rapidly Growing Stock Markets
Capital markets are not new to India. The Mumbai Stock Exchange
(BSE) was established in 1875 and is the oldest stock exchange in Asia.65
"At the beginning of the twentieth century, India had four functioning stock
exchanges... with well defined rules governing listing, trading and
settlement rules" and by 1947 over 800 companies were listed and trading
on Indian exchanges.66 According to some commentators, in 1947 India
inherited what was, at least formally, the best financial market in the
developing world.67
62 Id. Dharmapala and Khanna do not find evidence that the Clause 49 reforms caused an
increase in foreign institutional investment. Id. at 30.
63 See id. at 31. At least in India, foreign and institutional investors have generally
demanded great disclosure and a more rigorous, clear, and recognizable governance regime.
See NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INDIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter NATIONAL FOUNDATION]; LALITA
SOM, STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 (2006).
64 Infosys touts as its mission: "To achieve our objectives in an environment of fairness,
honesty and courtesy towards our clients, employees, vendors and society at large."
Infosys-About Infosys/Who We Are, http://www.infosys.com/about/who-we-are/
default.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Since its inception, Infosys has won a number of
awards for its corporate governance practices. See Infosys-About Infosys/Awards,
http://www.infosys.com/about/awards/default.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Furthermore,
"Infosys pays its directors one of the highest annual retainers in India-nearly $45,000 a
year." Is Indian Business Ready for a Brave New World of Tough Corporate Governance?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON Dec. 22, 2005, http://www.whartonsp.com/articles/article.asp
?p=433384&seqNum=3. Its board has directors from around the world, such as Jeffrey
Lehman, former president of Cornell University and a well-respected legal academic. See
Infosys-Management Profiles, http://www.infosys.com/newsroom/journalist-resources/
management-profiles.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Of course, corporate governance
standards at Infosys are not the norm in India.
65 See SOM, supra note 63, at 6.
66 See id.
67 How Some Firms in India Succeed by Bypassing Entrenched Financial and Legal
Systems, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON Nov. 1, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:335 (2009)
While India in 1947 had "reasonably functioning stock markets and a
fairly well developed (if not extensive) banking system, [as well as] ... a
nascent but vibrant equity culture among a section of the urban populace,"
the view of many is that "India squandered its early advantages" through its
post-independence regulatory regime. 68  Post-independence and prior to
economic liberalization, India's capital markets remained largely
underdeveloped. During this period, India's capital markets were
characterized by significant government interference but little regulatory
oversight of trading activity.69
Along with India's rapid economic growth, India's capital markets-
particularly its equity markets-have vastly expanded.7° The BSE and the
National Stock Exchange (NSE), the country's two leading exchanges, have
thousands of listed companies, rivaling the world's largest securities
market-the United States.7 ' As of September 2007, there were
approximately 4800 companies listed on the BSE and approximately 1200
on the NSE. Despite the large numbers of listed companies, the market
capitalization and trading volume of these exchanges were dominated by
the top companies.73 Trading on India's markets has become increasingly
active. According to a recent study, "in both 2005 and 2006, the number of
/article.cfm?articleid= 1596&CFID=3677137&CFTOKEN=82911816.
68 Omkar Goswami, Getting There-Pretty Rapidly: The State of Corporate Governance
in India, in A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH ASIA 130
(Farooq Sobhan & Wendy Wemer, eds., 2003) available at http://www.bei-
bd.org/docs/cg 1 .pdf.
69 See PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 242.
70 Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 10. While India's equity markets are highly
developed, "relative to similarly situated developing countries," its debt markets, particularly
"markets for publicly-traded corporate debt (bonds) are virtually non-existent." Id. See also
PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at xxv. -
71 See Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 7. There are also twenty regional exchanges, but
the BSE and NSE comprise the bulk of the trading volumes on Indian exchanges. The BSE
is the oldest stock exchange in Asia, and dominated Indian stock markets until 1994 when
SEBI established the NSE. See SOM, supra note 63, at 5-8.
72 See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 60. In comparison, as of December 31, 2007,
NYSE, the worlds' largest cash equities exchange, had a total of 2805 issuers, including
operating companies as well as various funds. NYSE Group-Number of Issuers (2003-
present), http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tabid=l 15 (follow "Listed
Companies" hyperlink; then follow "NYSE Group-Number of Issuers (2003-present)"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The NASDAQ has approximately 3200 listed
companies. NASDAQ, NASDAQ Global Platform, March 2007, http://www.nasdaq.com
/reference/NASDAQ%20Global%20Platform%20-%2OFact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
73 Many of the companies on the BSE have low market capitalization with little or no
trading in their stock. The preponderance of low-capitalized companies on India's stock
exchanges is often identified as a "fundamental structural flaw in India's capital markets...
[that encourages] stock price manipulation and insider trading, and overburdens the current
regulatory system." SOM, supra note 63, at 3.
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trades on the NSE was the third highest in the world, just behind NASDAQ
and the NYSE, and several times the number of trades on the LSE or
Euronext. ' 74 This rapid expansion of the capital markets was accompanied
by significant regulatory changes.
B. Regulation of Public Companies in India
In order to understand the process and implications of recent
regulatory changes in India's corporate governance regime, it is important
to have a general overview of India's legal tradition and its current
regulation of public companies. This section begins by presenting an
overview of India's legal tradition, and follows by outlining the basic
corporate law and regulatory framework applicable to public companies in
India. It also addresses the role of the government institutions responsible
for developing and enforcing Indian corporate law, as well as the role of the
judiciary in advancing corporate law.
1. Overview of Indian Corporate Law
a. India's Legal Tradition
As a former British colony, India is generally viewed as a common law
country with an Anglo-American legal tradition.75 Indian corporate law
derives from the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1850, which was modeled on
the English Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844. 76 Indian corporate law
continued to emulate English law even after India achieved independence in
1947. 7' The Bhabha Committee, whose recommendations ultimately
formed the basis for the Companies Act, 1956,78 was convened partly in
response to the report of the United Kingdom's Cohen Committee, which
recommended far-reaching changes to the English Companies Act, 1929. 79
74 See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 60.
75 See Andreas Buss, Dual Legal Systems and the Basic Structure Doctrine of
Constitutions: The Case of India, 19 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 23, 26-27 (2004). The Indian
constitution reflects significant American influence. When the framers of the Indian
constitution initially gathered in 1946, an important aspect of their approach to drafting
involved a careful study of the Constitution of the United States, with respect to both the
spirit of compromise the document reflects, as well as many of the substantive provisions.
See Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in
India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950-2000), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 413, 421 (1998).
76 P.M. Vasudev, Capital Stock, Its Shares and Their Holders: A Comparison of India
and Delaware (Mar. 2007) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssm.com
/abstract=913282.
77 Id.
78 The Companies Act, 1956, Acts of Parliament, 1956, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl .asp?tfnm= 195601.
79 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Report of the Companies Act Amendment
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Further, the Companies Act drew inspiration from the English model with
regard to much more than simple timing. The influence of English
company law on the Indian Companies Act, 1956, was so prevalent that one
Indian committee, convened the following year to assess the success of the
new Companies Act and recommend any necessary amendments, saw fit to
specifically justify the ways in which they had deviated from the British
model. 8°
Despite India's common law tradition, "many of its laws were in fact
codified during British rule. This was then overlaid with further legislation
when, in post-independence India, the government implemented a socialist
reform agenda in encompassing all areas of commercial activity, including
corporate finance. 81  From 1947 to 1991, the government's policies
included heavy regulation of public companies; including significant
government involvement in public equity offerings that lead to legal
measures that "established a tightly-controlled regime covering almost all
aspects of corporate management." Thus, much of the post-liberalization
period involved dismantling or amending the socialist codification process,
and establishing new institutions, such as SEBI, to oversee increasingly
privatized capital markets. 
83
b. The Companies Act of 1956
The Companies Act, as codified in 1956 and amended thereafter,
provides the general legal framework for companies in India, governing the
incorporation, functioning, and winding up of Indian companies. All
registered companies in India, whether public or private, are governed by
Committee, 1957, at 2.
80 Id. at 6.
81 Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 14. For an overview of the pre-liberalization
corporate and securities laws, see id. at 15. This pre-liberalization period is often referred to
as the period of the "License Raj" because it was characterized by requirements of
government permission to engage in all sorts of standard business activities, resulting in a
highly restrictive corporate environment in which political and family connections became
increasingly important for obtaining the necessary permits to conduct corporate activities.
See Tania Mazumdar, Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian Corporate
Governance Law, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 243, 246 (2007).
82 Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 15. For example, prior to 1992, the Capital Issues
(Control) Act, 1947 (CICA), required the permission of the central government for the
issuance of capital, and gave the government authority to control pricing of new issues of
equity. Id. at 18. Also, in line with the government's socialist agenda, the state "became the
principal provider of both debt and equity capital for private firms." Balasubramanian et al.,
supra note 60, at 5.
83 For example, as part of the relaxation of central government control over corporate





the Companies Act. 8 4 Voluminous and containing hundreds of sections, the
Companies Act draws heavily from the U.K. Companies Act of 1948.85
The regulatory framework governing corporate boards is set forth in
Sections 252 to 269 of the Companies Act. The corporate governance
principles in the Companies Act, particularly with respect to listed
companies, are limited. For example, similar to the corporate law of most
U.S. states, the Companies Act does not address specific corporate
governance measures such as composition and independence of a
company's directors, or the minimum qualifications required to become a
director, though it does include some provisions dealing with management
and administration of companies.86
Similarly, the Companies Act of 1956 offers little in the way of
investor protection, focusing primarily on cases of oppression and
mismanagement. As discussed in Part II.B.4 below, these provisions have
provided little protection to shareholders. There is also minimal focus on
transparency or disclosure. For example, Indian companies whose shares
are not traded on any Indian stock exchange are not required to prepare or
distribute quarterly and interim reports to shareholders.
In recent years, there have been a number of attempts by the Ministry
of Company Affairs (MCA) (previously the Department of Company
Affairs within the Ministry of Finance) to amend the Companies Act to
improve corporate governance and to modernize India's company law.
However, the major amendments to the Act are still pending.8 7 Overall, as
described in Part III.A.2 below, the government thus far has been unable to
amend the Companies Act to incorporate the corporate governance
principles adopted in Clause 49.
2. The Stock Exchanges and the Listing Agreement
As discussed above, India has two national stock exchanges-the BSE
and the NSE. Companies seeking to list on either exchange are required to
comport with the requirements of the respective exchange's Listing
Agreement. The stock exchanges are Self Regulatory Organizations
(SROs) that are registered with and regulated by SEBI. The SEBI Act of
84 Similar to the legal framework governing public companies in the United States, public
companies listed on one of the Indian national exchanges must comply with the rules and
regulations prescribed by SEBI and the listing agreements of the stock exchange on which
they are listed, as well as other laws.
85 See Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, Diversity in Shareholder Protection in Common Law
Countries, 5 J. INST'L COMPARISONS 3 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--988409.
86 See Sumant Batra, India: An Overview of Corporate Governance of Non-Listed
Companies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES IN EMERGING MARKETS
167, 169 (OECD Publishing 2006).
87 Id. at 168-69.
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1992 grants SEBI the authority to regulate the stock exchanges, including
the power to conduct inspection of the stock exchanges. 88
The Listing Agreement defines the rules and processes that companies
must follow in order to remain listed companies on an Indian stock
exchange. This agreement stipulates many actions that listed companies
must take, from payment of listing fees to observance of various corporate
governance standards.89  Some specific examples include periodic
disclosures of financial statements, observance of requirements concerning
independent directors, and compliance with any additional rules and
regulations that may be put forth by SEBI or other government agencies. 90
The Listing Departments of the exchanges monitor compliance with the
provisions of the listing agreements, and can impose disciplinary measures
in the event of noncompliance, up to and including delisting. 91
Instead of legislative changes, the primary corporate governance
reforms in India have been instituted through changes to the Listing
Agreement. As described in Part III.A.2 below, Clause 49 was instituted
through changes to the Listing Agreement, in part because of the flexibility
that SEBI has had in amending the Listing Agreement.
3. The Regulators: SEBI and the MCA
Public companies in India face a fragmented regulatory structure. The
Companies Act is administered by the MCA and is currently enforced by
the Company Law Board (CLB). The MCA, SEBI, and the stock
exchanges share jurisdiction over listed companies, with the MCA being the
primary government body charged with administering the Companies Act
of 1956, while SEBI has served as the securities market regulator since
1992.92
In connection with India's economic liberalization and the move
toward further development of India's capital markets, the central
government established regulatory control over the stock markets through
the formation of the SEBI. 9' SEBI, which was originally established in
1988 as an advisory body, was granted authority to regulate the securities
88 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, No. 15, Acts of Parliament,
1992, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl .asp?tfim=l 99215.
89 BSE, Guidelines for Listing, http://www.bseindia.com/about/abintrobse/listsec.asp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, About MCA,
http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryWebsite/dca/aboutus/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2009).
93 See The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, supra note 88; see also
Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 18.
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market under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act of 1992
(SEBI Act). 94  Through the passage of this Act, Parliament established
SEBI as an independent statutory authority, but required it to submit annual
reports to the legislature.
SEBI was envisioned to serve as a "market oriented independent entity
to regulate the securities market" akin to the role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States. 95 In fact, the stated
purpose of the agency is "to protect the interests of investors in securities
and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities
market."
The realm of SEBI's statutory authority has long been the subject of
heated debate. Some have argued that "it may be stated that the SEBI Act
of 1992 was mostly a list of responsibilities of the regulator and was devoid
of reasonable statutory backing for discharging the responsibilities. 97 The
primary tasks with which SEBI has been charged include "regulating the
business in stock exchanges and any other securities markets... prohibiting
fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to securities markets...
prohibiting insider trading in securities ... [and] regulating substantial
acquisition of shares and take-over of companies.. .."98 However, SEBI's
authority for carrying out these tasks has not always been clear. For
example, when Indian financial markets experienced massive share price
rigging frauds in the early 1990s, SEBI was found not to have sufficient
statutory power to carry out a full investigation of the frauds. 99
Accordingly, the SEBI Act was amended in order to grant it sufficient
powers with respect to inspection, investigation, and enforcement, in line
with the powers granted to the SEC in the United States.100
One of the most contentious aspects of SEBI's power is its rulemaking
authority. As mentioned, SEBI has made significant amendments to the
Listing 'Agreement to greatly increase the responsibilities of listed
companies. However, some have disputed that SEBI was ever granted the
authority to impose additional governance rules in this fashion. In the
United States, for example, the SEC can point to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as
specifically conferring upon it the authority to prescribe rules to implement
94 Id. The SEBI Act of 1992 has since been amended three times: in 1995, 1999, and
2002. See Asian Corporate Governance Association, http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files
/Kania-rep_032005.pdf.
95 See Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 18.
96 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, supra note 88.
97 Suchismita Bose, Securities Markets Regulations, 1 ICRA BULLETIN: MONEY &
FINANCE 83, 106, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 140107 (2005).
98 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, supra note 88.
99 Bose, supra note 97, at 87.
o Id. at 106.
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the legislation.101 SEBI, on the other hand, cannot point to a similar piece
of legislation to support imposition of the same requirements on Indian
companies through Clause 49. Instead, SEBI must look to the basics of its
own purpose, as given in the SEBI Act. Under Section 1 I A of the SEBI
Act, authority is granted to "specify, by regulations, the matters relating to
issue of capital, transfer of securities and other matters incidental
thereto ... and the manner in which such matters shall be disclosed by the
companies."10 2 In addition, SEBI is granted broad authority to "specify the
requirements for listing and transfer of securities and other matters
incidental thereto."' 103 SEBI's exercise of this broad authority has led to
strife with the MCA.
Since SEBI's creation in 1992, tensions have arisen between SEBI and
the MCA. The conflicts between SEBI and the MCA stem in part from the
reality that many of the regulatory responsibilities created by the various
pieces of relevant legislation are exercised concurrently by multiple
regulatory agencies. This overlap results from the charges of the agencies
themselves, as well as from issues such as the expansion of SEBI's
powers. 104 Under the Companies Act, MCA is responsible for regulating
all registered companies.' 10  However, under the SEBI Act, all listed
companies fall under the authority of SEBI as well. 106 It should be noted
that SEBI itself disputes the existence of any regulatory overlap.10 7
However, this assessment stands at odds with the record of disagreement
between the two agencies concerning the respective responsibilities of each
regulatory body. As will be seen in Part III.A.2, these long-standing
conflicts between SEBI and the MCA spilled over into India's corporate
101 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of chapters 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 of U.S.C.).
102 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, supra note 88.
103 Id. The SEC, by contrast, is not granted such sweeping authority by Section 4 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2008).
104 The MCA strongly resisted SEBI's requests for additional power. Richa Mishra and
K.R. Srivats, SEBI Seeks More Powers Under Companies Act, HINDU Bus. LINE, Dec. 15,
2003, available at http://www.blonnet.com/2003/12/16/stories/2003121601760400.htm
(noting existence of turf war and SEBI's attempts to expand its powers); SEBI Act to Be
Amended, HINDU Bus. LINE, June 1, 2002, available at http://www.thehindu
businessline.com/2002/06/02/stories/200206020l200200.htm; Shaji Vikraman & Hema
Ramakrishnan, Safeguards Likely in SEBI's Search and Seizure Powers, HINDU Bus. LINE,
May 2, 2002, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2002/05/02/stories
/2002050201500100.htm (noting DCA's opposition and existence of a "turf war").
105 Govt. to Form A Panel to Reduce SEBI, DCA Overlap, INDLAW NEWS, June 2, 2003,
available at http://news.indlaw.com/l DOD72FA584A040D8FDFB8FAF8315665.
106 id.
107 Richa Mishra, No Overlap Between SEBI, DCA: Bajpai, HINDU Bus. LINE, Sep. 12,





4. The Role of the Judiciary in Development of Corporate Law
As in the Anglo-American system, the Indian legal framework allows
for a significant role for the judiciary. 1 8  For example, the primary
corporate governance measures under the Companies Act are the statutory
provisions protecting shareholders against "oppression"' 10 9  and
"mismanagement."' 0  Shareholders can bring suit against a company's
management or board of directors in cases of oppression and
mismanagement, in order to protect shareholder interests.
While Indian courts have developed extensive case law interpreting
and applying the provisions of the Companies Act, these judicial judgments
have not radically altered the state of corporate governance in India as
Clause 49 has."' In fact, some even argue that the lack of judicial action
has meant that "India seems to have moved away from the common law
tradition of changing the law on a case-by-case basis and toward the
tradition of detailed rule-making backed by public enforcement
mechanisms, which is usually associated with the civil law countries."' 
12
The primary reason behind the lack of development of corporate
governance standards through the judiciary is the failure of the Indian
judicial system to effectively resolve corporate disputes. India's judicial
process has long been the subject of criticism. According to a vocal critic
of the Indian legal system, the judicial process involves countless delays,
and when decisions are finally rendered by courts, they are often ignored. 13
"The defining feature of the Indian court system is the staggering delays
involved in resolving a case by trial, which typically would take up to 20
years." 'I4  Given the significant delays in bringing a suit, there is little
incentive for shareholders to advocate for their rights through the courts.
According to a recent report by the World Bank, the process under
108 See Sripati, supra note 75, at 423-24, 439. For example, the Indian Constitution
contains an explicit grant of the power of judicial review to the Supreme Court, applicable to
any law or order that it felt to be in violation of any fundamental right. See INDIA CONST. art.
32.
109 "Oppression" refers to conducting of the affairs of a company in a manner prejudicial
to public interest or interests of the company or the shareholders or in a manner oppressive to
any members. The Companies Act, 1956, supra note 78, § 397.
110 "Mismanagement" occurs when the affairs of a company are conducted in a manner
prejudicial to the interests of the company or to the public interest. The Companies Act,
1956, supra note 78, § 398.
1 Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 31.
112 Lele & Siems, supra note 85, at 5.
113 See ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS AND THEIR JUDGMENTS: PREMISES, PREREQUISITES,
CONSEQUENCES (Rupa & Co. 2001).
114 Armour & Lele, supra note 43, at 28.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:335 (2009)
which cases brought pursuant to the Companies Act were adjudicated was
similarly mired in delay and ineffectiveness. For example the Company
Law Board (CLB), the primary judicial authority for enforcement of the
Companies Act, experienced significant delays and a large backlog of
cases. 1 5 The delays at the CLB level were further compounded by the
ability of parties to appeal CLB decisions to the high courts and Supreme
Court. As of October 2001 the vast majority of rulings had been appealed,
and over twenty million cases awaited final judgment in the various Indian
courts. 16
In order to ameliorate this backlog of cases and to consolidate various
duties previously allocated to several different government bodies, the
Indian Parliament amended the judicial structure with respect to corporate
law matters in 2002. The Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002
(2002 Act), created a new National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), along
with its appellate body, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(NCLAT), to enforce the provisions of the Companies Act. 7 The NCLT
was also granted jurisdiction with respect to matters previously distributed
between several different government agencies, including management of
"sick industrial companies" and the dismantling of unprofitable companies,
a power that previously rested with the various Indian high courts. 1 8
115 In the period from 1997 to 2001, nearly 170,000 cases were brought to the CLB. At
the end of 2001, 11,000 of these cases were still pending-and this number was actually
down from nearly 20,000 cases still pending at the end of 1999. WORLD BANK & INT'L
MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES, at 21 (2004),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc-cgind.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK
REPORT].
116 Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions for the
Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1448-49 (2007). The delays resulting from this backlog of
cases have been severe-petitioners are occasionally made to wait as long as six years for a
preliminary hearing, and as long as twenty years for a final judgment. Id.
117 The Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 11, Acts of Parliament, 2003.
118 Id. India's insolvency system has had a history of problems. According to a recent
World Bank study, the process of liquidating a company takes as long as twelve years in
India, and provides a return of only sixteen cents per dollar invested. No Easy Cure for
Industrial Sickness, ECONOMIC TIMES (India), Jan. 2, 2008, available at http://economic
times. indiatimes.com/News/Economy/Policy/No-easy-cure-for - industrial-sickness/rssartic
eshow/2667172.cms. One of the purposes of the NCLT is to ameliorate problems in the
insolvency process. The NCLT is responsible for the "revival and rehabilitation of sick
industrial companies," i.e. an industrial company that has either accumulated losses equaling
fifty percent or greater of the company's average net worth over the preceding four years, or
has failed to repay its debts for three consecutive quarters despite written demand for
repayment by the company's creditors. Id. Once the NCLT has determined that a company
is a "sick industrial company," it may set a timeline for the company to reestablish a net
worth in excess of its accumulated losses, or repay its outstanding debts. If such action is
not feasible, the NCLT may order the financial reconstruction of the company, change or
takeover of management, merger or sale of the company, or other measures "as may be




With respect to enforcing the Companies Act, the NCLT's powers are
largely the same as those of the CLB; in fact, many of the amendments
given effect by the 2002 Act literally serve only to replace the term
"Company Law Board" with the term "Tribunal." Among its other powers,
the NCLT has the authority to provide relief in cases of oppression and
mismanagement, remove management, direct a special audit, inspect the
company's accounts, and impose fines for certain violations of the
Companies Act. 119 However, recent data indicate that these abilities are
seldom used. 120
One of the most significant changes of the 2002 Act is to provide for a
separate appellate body specifically convened to hear appeals from the
rulings of the NCLT. The purpose of this amendment was in part to lift a
burden from the various high courts. Given the mutually compounding
problems that arise when a grossly understaffed judiciary is asked to handle
a massive caseload, it becomes readily apparent why a separate Company
Law Tribunal with its own counterpart appellate body was needed.I
Although the rulings of the Appellate Tribunal are still appealable to the
Supreme Court of India under the new enforcement scheme, 22 the
availability of a separate appellate body specifically tasked with handling
appeals from the NCLT's rulings was intended to prevent the tremendous
logjam of proceedings previously seen in the various high courts. However,
as discussed in Part IV.I.3 below, despite efforts to allow for enforcement
sweeping, and even extends to mandating that a company be liquidated and wound up if it
determines that the situation of the company is such that it is not likely to become viable at
any point in the reasonably foreseeable future. These additional powers dealing with the
restructure and winding up of companies that are failing to turn a profit are designed to help
shore up a substantial weakness under the old regulatory scheme, and represent an important
step in dealing with the difficulties presented by insolvency. Id. Prior to the establishment
of the NCLT, the responsibility for managing "sick industrial companies" was assigned to
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). This body was created by the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), and was entrusted by that
Act with many of the same powers of investigation and winding up of corporate entities
designated as sick industrial companies. See Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1986. The BIFR and its related appellate board were
dissolved by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003. This Act
was passed on Jan. 1, 2004, and repealed SICA in its entirety. The Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 2004.
119 See Balasubramanian et al., supra note 60, at 23-24. The authors found that of 301
companies that responded to their survey, only 6 had seen the Tribunal remove a CEO or
other executive, remove a director, or order a special audit. Id. at 24.
120 id.
121 India's judicial appointment process has been described as lengthy and cumbersome,
leading to significant shortages in the number of judges. For example, in 2003, the number
of judges serving on India's various high courts was 25% below the amount that was
statutorily required. See Bhat, supra note 116, at 1449.
122 The Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, supra note 117.
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of corporate governance standards through the NCLT, this process has led
to little real change.
C. The Traditional Ownership Structure of Indian Firms
This section explains the two primary ownership structures prevalent
in India: closed ownership structures and Public Sector Undertakings. As
set forth in Part IV.I.2, infra, companies with these ownership structures
have largely resisted India's corporate governance reform efforts.
1. Closed Ownership Structures
India's experience with corporate ownership resembles that of most
emerging economies. 123 Corporate governance issues have long been a
significant problem in emerging economies due to the complex and
overlapping ownership and control structures evident in firms there. In
these firms, management is generally tied to a controlling block of inside
shareholders who have control rights in excess of their ownership rights.
124
Historically, prior to independence, the prevailing model of ownership
of Indian firms was the so-called "managing agency model." 125 Managing
agencies, which functioned like holding companies, were business firms
that contracted to manage the affairs of companies that issued stock. These
agencies would then promote firms and used various means to exercise
control. Not only did managing agencies use managing agency contracts to
exercise control, but they also used:
[T]heir prestige, past performance and signature... to ensure
massive over-subscription of shares. Given excess demand, most of
these companies could split shareholdings into small enough
allotments to ensure that nobody-barring the managing agency-
had sufficiently large stocks to ensure their presence in the board of
directors. Dispersed ownership, thus, facilitated managing agencies
to retain cor orate control with relatively low equity
ownership ....
Post-independence, for the vast majority of Indian businesses,
ownership has been concentrated in the hands of family business groups,
123 Jayati Sarkar & Subarata Sarkar, Debt and Corporate Governance in Emerging
Economies: Evidence from India, 16 ECON. OF TRANSITION 293, 295 (2008).
124 See La Porta et al., supra note 25, at 471.
125 See Ananya Mukherjee Reed & Darryl Reed, Corporate Governance in India: Three
Historical Models and Their Development Impact, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC
REFORMS, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 25, 31-36 (Darryl Reed & Sanjoy
Mukherjee eds., 2004).
126 Goswami, supra note 68, at 129.
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and to a lesser extent, state-owned enterprises and promoters. 27 Ownership
structures of firms in India were a primary factor behind the lack of
disclosure and governance requirements under the Companies Act. Until
very recently, Indian companies had little dependence on global capital
markets for funds, as family business groups controlled the majority of
large companies and financial intermediaries played minor roles in firm
ownership.
Ownership of Indian firms has followed a complex pattern, with
family ownership (and its accompanying control and conflicts of interest
issues) being the mainstay of India's corporate landscape. 128 Even post-
liberalization, a significant portion of the largest companies in India
remained family-managed and promoted, although sometimes the
controlling family may have had only modest ownership control.
129
According to a 2006 study, nearly sixty percent of India's 500 largest
companies were affiliated with family business groups, and another eleven
percent were wholly or significantly government-owned. 130  Even
companies at the very top of India's corporate sector were family
controlled. In 2006, of the companies on the BSE Sensitive Index (Sensex),
representing the top thirty companies and accounting for nearly a fifth of
the BSE's total market capitalization, nearly a third were family owned and
controlled. 131  When the complete set of listed and non-listed Indian
companies is considered, the percentage of family ownership jumps to
seventy percent. 132 Some well-known examples of family-owned corporate
groups are the Tatas, the Birlas, and the Ambanis. 1
33
In addition to the prevalence of family and state ownership,
"promoters" play an important and pervasive role in Indian corporate
governance. 13 One study revealed that prior to the 1990s, as a result of the
support of public financial institutions, the prominent industrial families
were typically able to maintain operational control of large private
127 See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 59; Family Businesses Raise Corporate
Governance Concerns, Says Moody's, INDIAN EXPRESS, Oct. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/231282.html [hereinafter Moody's].
128 Satheesh Kumar T. Narayanan, Indian Family-Managed Companies: The Corporate
Governance Conundrum (2006) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract = 1093230.
129 Id. at 21.
0 See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 59.
131 Narayanan, supra note 128, at 20. In smaller listed companies on the BSE, which
make up the largest portion of listed companies, family members generally own more than
50% of the company's shares. See SOM, supra note 63, at 7.
132 Batra, supra note 86, at 174.
133 Moody's, supra note 127.
134 A promoter is any person or persons that have, directly or indirectly, control of the
company. See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 61.
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companies even with minimal diversification in shareholdings. 135  The
study looked at the various companies held by several of the most
prominent Indian families, and found that in nearly half the companies, at
least twenty-five percent of the shares were held by public institutions.
136
For example, ten of the fifteen Tata companies and seven of the sixteen
Birla companies included in the study revealed at least twenty-five percent
public ownership.
However, with the 1990s came a change in strategy. As the economy
became more liberalized, the various corporate promoters were faced with
the threat of losing control in the face of significant increases in foreign
investment. 137 These promoters began increasing their respective stakes in
the companies they controlled, so much that a 2005 study of over 3000
companies found that nearly half the market capitalization of those
companies was directly held by the promoters. 138 This study additionally
suggested that the actual holdings likely exceed half, given that promoter
shareholding is often hidden in the form of other corporate bodies or
individual shareholders. In one case, the address provided by a company
for a non-promoter corporate shareholder actually turned out to be that of
the company's chairman.1 39  Regardless of how frequent such hidden
holdings actually are, it is clear that concentrated ownership still dominates
the Indian corporate landscape. However, this concentration of ownership
in India is slowly shifting. For example, non-promoter institutional
investors, both Indian and foreign, are making significant inroads in the
ownership of large Indian firms.' 0
2. Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs)
Public sector undertakings (PSUs), which are state owned enterprises,
represent major remnants of the Indian government's socialist policies prior
to 1991. PSUs have long occupied a dominant position in the Indian
economy-India's public sector consists of over 1300 PSUs, which
employed over seventy percent of the total industrial workforce. 141 "In
1980, public sector undertakings accounted for eighty percent of GDP and
135 K.S. Chalapati Rao & Atulan Guha, Ownership Pattern of the Indian Corporate
Sector: Implications for Corporate Governance 1, 11 (Inst. for Studies in Indus. Dev.,
Working Paper No. 2006/09, 2006), available at http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/wp0609.pdf.
136 Id. at 12.
131 Id. at 11-14.
138 Id. at 13.
13 Id. at 13 n.20.
140 See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 54, at 62. But see Rao & Guha, supra note 135, at
18.
141 See Lawrence Sdez & Joy Yang, The Deregulation of State-Owned Enterprises in




fourteen percent of non-agricultural GDP."'142 By 2003, PSUs accounted
for thirty-two percent of BSE's market capitalization, with the government-
controlled Oil and Natural Gas Corporation ranking first in market
capitalization.143 In fact, most listed PSUs "are larger in size, sales and
value than their private sector counterparts." 
144
Beginning in the 1990s, as a part of India's economic liberalization,
the government began large-scale privatization of PSUs. The government's
privatization process became more aggressive from 2000 to 2004, but has
slowed down in the past four years. 14 Therefore, a number of India's
largest companies continue to have significant government ownership.
III. THE PROCESS OF FORMAL CONVERGENCE IN INDIA
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Indian government started
implementing a significant overhaul of the country's corporate governance
system. As described by a recent paper on Clause 49, these corporate
governance reforms were aimed at "making Boards and Audit Committees
more independent, powerful and focused monitors of management" as well
as aiding shareholders, including institutional and foreign investors, in
monitoring management. 146 India's corporate governance reform effort was
channeled through a number of different paths and fraught with significant
conflict between SEBI and the MCA. While SEBI proceeded to adopt
considerable corporate governance reforms, the implementation and
enforcement of such reforms have lagged behind. Clearly, the reforms
adopted in India demonstrate formal convergence to the Anglo-American
model of governance; however, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether
this convergence has thus far moved beyond the formal level.
This part is organized as follows. Section A begins with an
examination of the process leading to adoption of Clause 49, and the
conflicts that arose between SEBI and the MCA in the reform process.
Next, section B illustrates that Clause 49-which went through a series of
amendments from initial adoption in 2000 to 2005 in order to enhance its
effectiveness-in many ways resembles governance reforms adopted in
developed countries, primarily those in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Section C then goes on to survey the failures in the
implementation and enforcement of Clause 49, and to consider how these
failures demonstrate that reforms currently are primarily limited to formal
changes.
142 Id.
143 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 115, at 1.
144 Goswami, supra note 68, at 135.
145 PANAGARIYA, supra note 10, at 302-03.
146 Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 61, at 7.
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A. Clause 49's Adoption-Challenges and Shortcomings
In 1998, SEBI formed a number of committees to help formulate
corporate governance standards for publicly listed Indian companies.
SEBI's governance reforms derived from the lobbying efforts of corporate
leaders in India, particularly those familiar with the governance debate
outside of India. After a detailed corporate governance code was proposed
by a leading industry group, SEBI adopted the recommendations of the first
committee formed to fashion a code of corporate governance and
introduced unprecedented corporate governance reforms via Clause 49 of
the Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges.
Continuing its long-standing rivalry with SEBI, the MCA responded to
SEBI's initial adoption of Clause 49 by establishing its own committees to
propose corporate governance standards for Indian public companies
through amendments to the Companies Act.
The MCA's process, however, was fraught with tensions with SEBI
which appeared to be unhelpful in any process to amend the Companies
Act. The failure of SEBI and the MCA to work together is especially
evident in the process by which the agencies have approached the corporate
governance framework in India. Specifically, SEBI has avoided
encouraging amendment of the Companies Act to include corporate
governance related provisions. Given the dynamic nature of the capital
market and SEBI's need to remain flexible and responsive to changing
situations, it may not be problematic that SEBI has preferred to enact
change through amendments to the Listing Agreement and through
committees. However, the opposition from the MCA to the convening of
these committees provides further evidence that the two agencies are simply
not on the same page.
Despite the MCA's attempts to amend the Companies Act, thus far
Clause 49 remains the most significant corporate governance reform.
Clause 49 established a new corporate governance regime. Like corporate
governance standards in the United States and the United Kingdom, India's
corporate governance reforms followed a fiduciary and agency cost model.
With a focus on the agency model of corporate governance, the Clause 49
reforms included detailed rules regarding the role and structure of the
corporate board and internal controls.147  The Clause 49 reforms were
phased in over several years, applying at first to larger entities and
eventually to smaller listed companies.' Eventually thousands of listed
147 Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India-Evolution and Challenges 20
(Jan. 17, 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-649857.
148 Not all publicly-traded and listed firms in India are required to comply with Clause
49. Clause 49 applies to all existing listed entities having a paid up share capital (number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the face value of the shares) of Rs. 3 crores (30 million




Indian public companies were required to comply with a new corporate
governance regime.
1. Industry's Role in Advocating Corporate Governance Reforms
India undertook efforts to improve its own corporate governance
system in the late 1990s. As noted above, prior to the mid-1990s, India's
corporate governance regime was particularly weak. Historically, there had
been little emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms in India, as
public companies in India were only required to comply with limited
governance and disclosure standards enumerated in the Companies Act of
1956, the Listing Agreement, and the accounting standards set forth by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).
India's first major corporate governance reform proposal was launched
by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), India's largest industry and
business association. CII-a non-government, not-for-profit, industry-led
and industry-managed organization dominated by large public firms-has
played an active role in the development of India's corporate governance
norms.149 In 1996, the CII formed a task force on corporate governance in
order to develop a corporate governance code for Indian companies.
Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code (CII Code) for listed companies
was proposed by the CII in April 1998.150 The CII Code contained detailed
governance provisions related to listed companies.
The CII Code was heavily influenced by corporate governance
standards found outside of India. Like many corporate governance codes,
the CII Code initially notes that one system of corporate governance is not
"unambiguously better than others[;] ... [therefore, it could not] design a
code of corporate governance for Indian companies by mechanically
importing one form or another."' 5 1 Nonetheless, it adopted at the outset the
Anglo-American system's focus on shareholders and creditors.'52
The CII Code was a significant step forward for a country not then
known for robust corporate governance standards. However, the CII
Code's voluntary nature did not result in a broad overhaul of governance
norms and practices by Indian companies. Although the CII Code was
$5.5 million) or more at any time in the history of the company. While all newly listed firms
(i.e., those listed after 2000) must comply with Clause 49, existing listed companies with
paid up share capital of less than Rs. 3 crore (approximately $750,000) are exempt from
compliance. See CLAUSE 49 (2003), supra note 13.
149 Confederation of Indian Industry, About Us, http://cii.in/menu-content.php
?menu-id=3 (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The CII also played an important role in the
economic reform efforts of the 1990s. See MooIj, supra note 45, at 24.
150 CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CODE
(1998) [hereinafter CII CODE].
'5 Id. at 1.
152 Id.
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welcomed with much fanfare and even adopted by a few progressive
companies, "it was felt that under Indian conditions a statutor rather than a
voluntary code would be more purposeful[] and meaningful." 1
2. SEBI, the MCA and the Battle of the Committees
a. The Birla Committee
Shortly after adoption of the CII voluntary code, SEBI sprang into
action to develop corporate governance standards for publicly listed
companies. SEBI's response was in part due to the CII's efforts to lobby
SEBI to adopt mandatory governance reforms. A significant manifestation
of SEBI's efforts to improve corporate governance standards in India was
its appointment of several high-level committees to recommend revisions of
Indian corporate governance standards. 154
SEBI appointed the Committee on Corporate Governance (the Birla
Committee) on May 7, 1999.'5 While SEBI has not disclosed the method
by which it selected committee members, the Birla Committee included
major industry representatives in India, including representatives from the156
CII and the All India Association of Industries. The Birla Committee
was chaired by Kumar Mangalam Birla, Chairman of the Aditya Birla
Group, one of India's largest conglomerates with businesses that vary from
petrochemicals and textiles to automobiles and information
communication.157 The Birla Committee also included a number of
representatives from various stock exchanges in India, including the BSE
153 NATIONAL FOUNDATION, supra note 63, at 7.
154 See id. at 7-8.
155 SHRI KUMAR MANGALAM BIRLA ET AL., THE SEC. EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE
KUMAR MANGALAM BIRLA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.5 (1999), available
at http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html [hereinafter BIRLA REPORT].
156 See id. Mr. Vijay Kalantri, the President of the All India Association of Industries and
Chairman and Managing Director of the Balaji Group, and Mr. Rajesh Shah, former
President of the CII and Managing Director of Mukand Ltd., a specialty steel maker, where
he was recently promoted to co-Chairman, both served on the Birla Committee. Other
members of the committee included Mr. Murthy, Chairman of Infosys and who later served
as the chairman of another SEBI committee formed to draft corporate governance rules, and
Rohit Bhagat, then Vice President at the Boston Consulting Group and currently COO of
Barclays Global Investors. People on the Move, EUR. PENSION & INV. NEWS, July 4, 2005, at
2, available at http://www.epn-magazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1608/Peopleon-the_
move.html.
157 Aditya Birla Group, Our Group, Kumar Mangalam Birla Profile,
http://www.adityabirla.com/the-group/km.nbirla-profile.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
The Birla family is one of the foremost business houses in India. The Aditya Birla Group
includes major Indian companies such as Hindalco, Grasim, and Ultra Tech Cement. Mr.
Birla also serves as director for the Reserve Bank of India and the Board of Trade, as well as
other prominent positions. Id.
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and the NSE, as well as representatives from the ICAI and government
agencies, including SEBI.' 58
The Birla Committee's recommendations were primarily focused on
improving the function and structure of company boards and increasing
disclosure to shareholders. The Birla Committee specifically invoked the
U.S. Blue Ribbon Committee's emphasis on independent directors in
discussing board recommendations. 159 With respect to company boards, the
Committee made specific recommendations regarding board representation
and independence. 16  The Committee also recognized the importance of
audit committees and made many specific recommendations regarding the
function and constitution of board audit committees.' 
61
The Committee made several recommendations regarding disclosure
and transparency issues, in particular with respect to information to be
provided to shareholders. Among other recommendations, the Birla
Committee stated that a company's annual report to shareholders should
contain a Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section, modeled
after annual reports issued by companies in the United States, and that
companies should transmit certain information, such as quarterly reports
and analyst presentations, to shareholders. 62 Furthermore, with respect to
158 See BIRLA REPORT, supra note 155, at Annex. I (listing names of the committee
members). The stock exchange representatives were (i) R.G. Patil, then Managing Director
of the NSE; Mr. Patil had previously been highly involved in the Indian Banking sector, and
is currently the Chairman of the Clearing Corp. of India Ltd. and Public Sector Divestment
Commission with the Indian government; (ii) Anand Rathy, then President of the BSE; Mr.
Rathu is also a chartered accountant, and has held several senior management positions in
one of India's largest industrial groups; he also founded a successful full financial services
firm focusing on wealth management, investment banking, and corporate finance; (iii) S.S.
Sodhi, Executive Director of the Delhi Stock Exchange; and (iv) Kamal Parekh, former
President of the Calcutta Stock Exchange who was forced to resign in 2001 in connection
with insider trading scandals and was eventually charged with criminal violations. Other
representatives included S.P. Chhajed, President of the ICAI, Dr. J. Bhagwati, then a joint
secretary in the finance ministry, Samir Biswas, Regional Director of India's Department of
Company Affairs, and L.K. Singhvi, then an Executive Director of SEBI. Id.
159 BIRLA REPORT, supra note 155, at § 6.6.
160 Id. §§ 6.5, 6.9. The Committee recommended that at least half the members should be
independent (or one-third if the chairman of the board is an independent director), and
defined an independent director as one who has no "material pecuniary relationship[, other
than remuneration,] or transaction with the company [et al.] ... which in the judgment of the
board may affect [the director's] independence of judgment." Id. To ensure that directors
give companies due attention, the Committee also recommended that directors be limited to
holding a maximum of ten directorships and five chairmanships. Id. § 11.2.
16 Id. § 9.6. The Committee recommended that the audit committee be composed of at
least three directors, all nonexecutive directors, a majority of independent directors, and at
least one director with financial and accounting knowledge. Id. The chair of the audit
committee should be independent. In addition, the Committee recommended that the audit
committee should meet at least three times a year. Id. § 9.7.
162 Id. § 13.4, 14.7.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:335 (2009)
shareholder complaints, the Committee recommended that a board
committee, chaired by a nonexecutive director, be formed to address
grievances. 
63
SEBI implemented the Birla Committee's sweeping proposed reforms
less than five months later in February 2000. At that time, SEBI revised its
Listing Agreement to incorporate the recommendations of the country's
new code on corporate governance. These rules--contained in Clause 49, a
new section of the Listing Agreement-took effect in phases between 2000
and 2003. The reforms applied first to newly listed and large companies,
then to smaller companies, and eventually to the vast majority of listed
companies. 164
b. The MCA Responds-The Chandra Committee
Following the addition of Clause 49 to the Listing Agreement, the
MCA appointed its own separate committees to recommend corporate
governance reforms to be incorporated into an amendment of the
Companies Act. The first committee appointed by the MCA was formed in
August 2002, following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in the United
States in July 2002. Chaired by Shri Naresh Chandra, a former Cabinet
secretary, the committee was charged with undertaking a wide-ranging
examination of corporate auditing and independent directors, although its
report focused primarily on auditing and disclosure matters. 165 The
Chandra Committee made a series of recommendations regarding, among
other matters, the grounds for disqualifying auditors from assignments, the
type of non-audit services that auditors should be prohibited from
performing, and the need for compulsory rotation of audit partners. In
addition, the Chandra Committee recommended greater consultations
between SEBI and the MCA, noting that the overlap has "'adverse
consequences' .. . with investors, companies and other stakeholders 'falling
between the cracks."' 166
c. SEBI's Counter Response-The Murthy Committee
While the MCA believed corporate regulation was its exclusive
domain, SEBI's reform efforts clearly indicated its opposing view. SEBI's
63 Id. § 14.12.
164 For a discussion of the phase-in process under the initial Clause 49 adoption, see
Black & Khanna, supra note 11; see also, Goswami, supra note 68, at 155 ("Today, listed
companies accounting for over 95% of India's market capitalisation have to follow SEBI's
corporate governance guidelines.").
165 NATIONAL FOUNDATION, supra note 63, at 8.





response to the Chandra Committee illuminates the state of relations
between the organizations. SEBI constituted another committee on
corporate governance chaired by Shri N.R. Narayana Murthy which began
meeting in the latter part of 2002.167 SEBI appointed the Murthy
Committee with terms of reference largely overlapping those of the
Chandra Committee, a move the MCA strongly opposed.8 Some in the
financial press viewed this clash as detrimental to governance reform
efforts, arguing that with each organization proposing conflicting reforms,
the efforts were slowed and businesses were left in a state of uncertainty.1 69
Despite much fanfare, the recommendations of the Chandra Committee did
not result in legislative changes, although certain of its recommendations
were incorporated in the report put forth by the Murthy Committee.
SEBI formed the Murthy Committee in the wake of the Enron scandal
in the United States in order to evaluate the adequacy of the existing Clause
49 and to further improve existing practices in order to enhance the
transparency and integrity of India's stock markets 70  and "ensure
compliance with corporate governance codes, in substance and not merely
in form.' 71 The Murthy Committee, like the Birla Committee, described
the international experience as a factor motivating reform. The Murthy
Committee stated that recent failures of corporate governance, particularly
in the United States, combined with the observations of India's stock
exchanges that compliance with Clause 49 up to that point had been
uneven, compelled the Murthy Committee to recommend further reform. 172
The background of many of the Murthy Committee members mirrored
those on the Birla Committee. Like the Birla Committee, many members of
the Murthy Committee came from or had significant ties to well-established
Indian companies. 73 The Chairman, Mr. Murthy, was Chairman and Chief
167 N.R. NARAYANA MURTHY ET AL., THE SEC. EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE SEBI
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.1 (2003), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in
/commreport/corpgov.pdf [hereinafter MURTHY REPORT].
168 Dalal, supra note 166; Y.H. Malegam, Birla Comm. Member, Address at the Fourth
Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture: Corporate Governance (Jan. 10, 2004), available at
http://prayatna.typepad.com/satya/files/2004 01_10_YH-MalegamCorporate_
Governance.html.
169 See, e.g., K.R. Srivats, India Inc. in a Bind Over SEBI Directive on Institutional
Investors, HINDU Bus. LINE, Sept. 2, 2003, available at http://www.thehindu
businessline.com/2003/09/02/stories/2003090201820300.htm (noting difficulties for
corporations when SEBI and DCA give conflicting reforms).
170 MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, § 1.6.3.
' Id. § 1.6.1.
172 Id. §§ 1.5.4-1.5.5.
173 See MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, at 30. Major "captains of industry" included R.
Gopalakrishnan (Executive Director of Tata Sons Ltd., as well as director of several other
Tata Group companies), D.M. Satwalekar (Managing Director and CEO of HDFC Standard
Life Insurance Company Ltd., and a member of the boards of several prominent Indian
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Mentor of Infosys, one of India's best-govemed companies. 17 4 In addition
to representatives from major Indian corporations, the Murthy Committee
included representatives from some of India's stock exchanges and industry
groups.175 SEBI representatives included some of those who had served on
companies), and T.R. Ramaswami (former commercial and investment banker who went on
to be the CEO of the Association of Merchant Bankers of India). See Educated Investors
Necessary for Sound Primary Market, Says AMBI Chief, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 18, 2000,
available at http://www.financialexpress.com/old/fe/daily/20001218/fnsl8054.html. Others
with significant ties to prominent Indian companies included Y.H. Malegam (then Managing
Partner and Chartered Accountant of S.B. Billimoria & Co., a prominent accounting firm,
and a board member of the NSE and a number of prominent companies, including Siemens
Ltd., Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., and Tata Tea Ltd.). See Y.H. Malegam: Executive
Profile and Biography, Bus. WK, available at http://investing.businessweek.com
/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personld=8369189&privcapld=22499164
&previousCapld=20332575&previousTitle=ABC%20Bearings%20Ltd. Ashook Soota
(President of the CII who previously served as President of Wipro, and co-founded a leading
IT consulting firm). See MindTree-About Us-Board of Directors-Ashok Soota,
http://www.mindtree.com/aboutus/ashoksoota.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Another
with significant ties to prominent Indian companies was Omkar Goswami (Chief Economist
at the CII until 2004, now a director at Infosys, the Editor of Business India magazine, and
serving on the boards of several prominent companies, including Dr. Reddy's Laboratories
Ltd.). See Infosys-About Us-Management Profiles-Dr. Omkar Goswami,
http://www.infosys.com/about/management-profiles/omkar-goswami.asp (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
174 N.R. Narayana Murthy, The World's Richest People, FORBES.COM,
http://wwxv.forbes.com /lists/2006/10/7SE5.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
'75 The Murthy Committee included Ravi Narain (the Managing Director and CEO of
India's National Stock Exchange (NSE), who has also been a director of several companies);
Manoj Vaish (then the CEO and Executive Director of the Bombay Stock Exchange, and
later the CEO of Dun & Bradstreet Services India). See Mr. Ravi Narain,
http://www.nfcgindia.org/rn.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Murthy Committee members
from industry groups included A.C. Muthiah (President of the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry). See A. C. Muthiah, President-elect of FICC1, HINDU,
Oct. 11, 2002, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/10/12/stories /20021012022
51800.htm. R.K. Somany (the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and
Industry of India and also the Chairman and Managing Director of Hindustan Sanitaryware
& Industries Ltd). See R.K. Somany Chosen to Head Assocham, HINDU Bus. LINE, Sept. 29,
2002, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2002/09/29/stories/20020929014
50300.htm. M.K. Doogar (Chairman of the Capital Markets Committee of PHD Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, an organization dedicated to promoting industry, trade, and
economic entrepreneurship in India). See PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Committees, http://phdcci.in/committees-tk.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Also A.K.
Narayan (President of Tamilnadu Investor's Association, a group formed for the purpose of
educating small investors and protecting investor interests). See TIA-About TIA,
http://www.tia india.com/htm/tia_about.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Also M.K. Chouhan
(Chairman of the Mahendra & Young Knowledge Foundation, an organization dedicated to
fostering development of good corporate governance. In addition to serving on several
boards, he is also Vice Chairman of the Global Advisory Board of the Asian Centre for
Corporate Governance). See Chouhan Profile, http://www.nfcgindia.org/M%20K%20




the Birla Committee, such as D.N. Raval and Pratip Kar, Executive
Directors of SEBI.
Like the Birla Committee, the Murthy Committee examined a range of
corporate governance issues relating to corporate boards and audit
committees, as well as disclosure to shareholders. The Murthy Committee
focused heavily on the role and structure of corporate boards and
strengthened the director independence definition in the then-existing
Clause 49, particularly to address the role of insiders on Indian boards.'
1W
For example, while the new definition actually encompassed the old, it also
indicated, among other things, that the director cannot be related to
promoters or management at the board level, or one below the board; an
executive of the company in the preceding three years; a supplier, service
provider, or customer of the company; or a shareholder owning two percent
or more of the company.177 The Murthy Committee also recommended that
nominee directors (i.e., directors nominated by institutions, particularly
financial institutions, with relationships with the company) be excluded
from the definition of independent director, and be subject to the same
responsibilities and liabilities applicable to any other director.7 8 In order to
improve the function of boards, the Murthy Committee recommended that
they should also receive training in the company's business model 179 and
quarterly reports on business risk and risk management strategies. 180
The Murthy Committee paid particular attention to the role and
responsibilities of audit committees. It recommended that audit committees
be composed of "financially literate" members, with at least one member
having accounting or related financial management expertise.' 8 ' It
provided a greater role for the audit committee as well. For example, the
Murthy Committee recommendations promoted disclosure and approval of
related party transactions by the audit committee. 182  In addition, the
committee stated that whistle-blowers must have access to the audit
committee without first having to inform their supervisors, and that
companies should annually affirm that they have not denied access to the
audit committee or unfairly treated whistle-blowers generally.' 
83
Although SEBI initially implemented Clause 49 in 2000 in response to
the Birla Committee's recommendations, Clause 49 reached its current
176 MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, § 3.10.14.
177 id.
178 Id. §§ 3.8.1.1, 3.8.1.2.
179 Id. § 3.5.2.4.
18o Id. § 35.1.7.
's' MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, § 3.2.2.3.
182 Id. § 3.4.1.5.
'
83 Id. § §3.11.1.3, 3.11.2.4.
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form in response to the Murthy Committee's recommendations.'1 4  The
Murthy Committee's report was released on February 8, 2003. The
intention was to incorporate its main recommendations into SEBI's Listing
Agreement. While there were many changes to Clause 49 as a result of the
Murthy Report, governance requirements with respect to corporate boards,
audit committees, shareholder disclosure, and CEO/CFO certification of
internal controls constituted the largest transformation of the governance
and disclosure standards of Indian public companies. As is clear in Part
III.B below, many provisions of the revised Clause 49 mirror those found in
Anglo-American models of corporate governance.
d. The MCA's Response to the Murthy Committee-The Irani
Committee
Following appointment of the Murthy Committee by SEBI and
revision of Clause 49, the MCA again sprang into action to attempt to
revise the Companies Act. In December 2004, the MCA reconvened the
Irani Committee. 8 5 The committee was led by J.J. Irani, a director of Tata
Sons, Ltd., 186 the primary shareholder in the large business conglomerate,
the Tata Group.'18  The Irani Committee was to evaluate the Companies
Act, with a focus on combining internationally accepted best practices in
corporate governance with attention to the particular needs of the growing
Indian economy.
The Irani Committee concluded that the best approach to corporate
governance in India would be to construct a single framework of
governance provisions applying to all companies so that all companies
would be required to comply with a uniform set of rules. 188 However, the
Irani Committee resisted the view that the regulation of public companies
should be handed over entirely to SEBI, and argued that the central
184 SEBI, ISSUES UNDER CLAUSE 49 AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/clause49.html; Posting of geetika to CAclubindia Blog,
Articles on Clause 49 of Listing Agreement, http://www.caclubindia.com/articles
/article list-detail.asp?articleid=59 (last visited July 28, 2007).
185 JAMSHED J. IRANI ET AL., EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW, REPORT OF THE
EXPERT COMMITTEE TO ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT ON THE NEW COMPANY LAW 3 (2005),
available at http://www.primedirectors.com/pdf/JJ%201rani%2OReport-MCA.pdf
[hereinafter IRANI REPORT]. In addition to the recommendations of the invited experts, a
concept document was made available to the general public, along with a system for
collecting opinions and recommendations from corporations, organizations, and individuals.
Id. at 3-4, 35.
186 Tata Group--Profiles-JJ Irani, http://www.tata.com/aboutus/articles/inside.aspx?
artid=/hpowkTj fl o= (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
187 Tata Group-Our Businesses-Tata Sons http://www.tata.com/company/profile.aspx
?sectid=DpOT+Lbrdvg= (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
188 IRANI REPORT, supra note 185, at 8-9.
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government should 1lay an important role with respect to corporate
governance matters.
Unlike the two SEBI-appointed committees, the Irani Committee
recognized that requirements of special or small companies be accounted
for through a series of exemptions, such that new small businesses are not
burdened with the same level of compliance cost as larger, established
corporations. In keeping with this theme, the Irani Committee
recommended a wider set of classifications for companies than just the
public or private labels, as the committee believed that the binary system of
classification was too narrow to account for the varying needs of companies
with different sizes and resources. The Committee's goal was to expand the
system of classifications and exemptions to tailor compliance costs to
needs, while maintaining sufficient regulatory stringency for large listed
companies that access public capital. 90
There are significant differences between the proposals contained in
the Irani report and the requirements of Clause 49, particularly with respect
to the board of directors. First, the requirements for independent directors
are different in several respects. Clause 49 requires that no independent
director have been an executive of the company in the preceding three
financial years,' 91 while the Irani Committee's recommendations weaken
that requirement so that independent directors, along with their relatives,'
92
have not been an employee of the company in any capacity in the past
single year. Clause 49 prohibits independent directors from having served
in any executive capacity in a statutory or internal auditing firm that has a
material association with the company for the past three years, while the
Irani report recommends the same requirement for a period of one year for
independent directors and their relatives. The Irani Committee also
recommends that a third of company directors be independent.1 93 This
recommendation follows on the heels of a firm statement by SEBI that there
would be no excusal of noncompliance with the Clause 49 provision
mandating that half of the board comprise independent directors. In
addition, the Irani Committee recommends that no age limit be prescribed
for independent directors, 194 and remained silent on the issue of term limits
for directors, while the Murthy committee felt both were necessary.
189 Id. at 10-1 1L
'90 Id. at 11-12.
'9' CIRCULAR, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED
COMPANIES-CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT § I(A)(iii) (Oct. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcir0104.pdf [hereinafter CLAUSE 49 (2004)].
192 IRANI REPORT, supra note 185, at 37.
' Id. at 35.
194 MURTHY REPORT, SUpra note 167, § 5.5.
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3. Competing Legislation.: Clause 49 and Amendment of the
Companies Act
A major criticism regarding SEBI's attempts at governance reform
involved its decision to reform the Listing Agreement rather than advocate
for amendment of the Companies Act. SEBI's conflicts with the MCA led
it to bypass the legislative route preferred by the MCA and attempt to
regulate through the Listing Agreement. SEBI was criticized in particular
for revising Clause 49 while many similar reforms were arguably included
in then-pending legislation, the Companies (Amendment) Bill of 2003.195
In particular, some questioned why SEBI would "resort to a hurried
revision of Clause 49" when comparable reforms were being debated in
Parliament. 196 SEBI's actions were seen as creating unnecessary expenses
and efforts for corporations in addition to appearing as attempts to
undermine the MCA.
197
The criticism grew sharper following withdrawal of the Companies
(Amendment) Bill in 2003. Many, including both press and industry
insiders, felt SEBI should have suspended its Clause 49 revisions until the
reforms could be fully considered legislatively. 198  Groups such as the
Federation of Indian Commerce and Industry and the CII advocated that
SEBI immediately withdraw the Clause 49 amendments.1 99 When SEBI
instead seemed to self-validate its actions through the Murthy Committee,
which endorsed many of SEBI's Clause 49 revisions, some questioned
whether SEBI's rule-making jurisdiction even covered its actions.200 The
title of an article in The Hindu sums up the feeling of many with respect to
SEBI's actions concerning Clause 49: SEBI, A Law Unto Itself.2 1 Viewing
SEBI as having overstepped its authority, the press seemed to agree with
the Chandra Committee that SEBI should only act through amendments to
the Companies Act itself.202 Even SEBI's own Murthy Committee, while




198 Corporates Train Their Guns on Listing Clause, HINDU Bus. LINE, Oct. 22, 2003,
available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/bline/2003/10/23/stories/200310230268
0100.htm; Pandey, supra note 195.
199 Corporates Train Their Guns, supra note 198.
200 See Pandey, supra note 195 (arguing that SEBI's actions went beyond the scope of
power conferred by Section 11(1) of the SEBI Act and Section 10 of the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act).
201 S. Balakrishnan, SEBI, A Law Unto Itself, HINDU, Oct. 10, 2005, at 19, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/10/stories/2005101000441700.htm.
202 Id. ("If any additional requirements are sought to be prescribed for listed companies,
then in areas where specific provisions exist in the Act it would be appropriate for SEBI to




not condemning Clause 49 specifically, recommended that any differences
between the Listing Agreement and the Companies Act be harmonized by
legislative amendment.2
°3
After failure of the first attempt to amend the Companies Act, the Irani
Committee was formed in 2004 to promulgate a set of corporate governance
recommendations for incorporation into the new Companies (Amendment)
Bill. However, this process has also stalled. Although the MCA had
previously said that the bill would be tabled during the winter 2007 session
of Parliament, a ministry official later said that it was unlikely to happen.
204
After years of delay, the bill was introduced in the Indian Parliament in
October 2008.205 In order to become law, the Bill must be read three times
in each house of Parliament (the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha) before it
is submitted to the President for assent. 20 6  As of October 2008, it was
uncertain whether the bill will be passed and presented to the President.
B. Clause 49 and Anglo-American Corporate Governance Models
In light of the Birla and Murthy Committees' clear consideration of
Anglo-American standards of governance, it is unsurprising that India's
corporate governance reform effort should contain similar provisions to
reform efforts outside of India that adopted such models.20 In its final
report, the Birla Committee noted its dual reliance on international
experiences-both as an impetus for reform following "high-profile
financial reporting failures ... in the developed economies," and as a model
Chandra Committee).
203 Id. ("Major differences between the requirements of the listing agreement and the
provisions of the Act should be identified and SEBI should then recommend to the
Government that the provisions of the Act be changed to bring it in line with the
requirements of the listing agreement.") (quoting Murthy Committee Report).
204 Rupesh Janve & Siddharth Zarabi, Now, Get Ready For the 'One-Person Company,'
REDIFF.COM, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/money/2007/nov/26opc.htm.
205 Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (India), Bill Intends to Modernize
Structure for Corporate Regulation in This Country, (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=44114.
206 Lok Sabha-Passage of Legislative Proposals in Parliament, http://164.100.47.134
/newls/legislation/Legislation.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Following the recent
accounting scandal at Satyam, there may be even further changes to the Companies bill that
was introduced in the Indian Parliament in 2008.
207 Corporate Governance in India: Has Clause 49 Made a Difference?, INDIA
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Jan. 25, 2007, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india
/article.cfm?articleid=4152. The six sources cited by the Birla Committee are: the Cadbury
Report (U.K.); the Greenbury Recommendations (U.K.); the London Stock Exchange's
Combined Code; the Confederation of Indian Industry's Desirable Corporate Governance
Code; the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; and the Blue Ribbon Committee
Report (U.S.).
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reform.20 8  Significantly, the Birla Committee singled out U.S. and U.K.
corporate governance reports and codes, such as the Report of the Cadbury
Committee, the Combined Code of the London Stock Exchange, and the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Corporate Governance in the United States.20 9
The Committee even directly sought out the input of Sir Adrian Cadbury,
chair of the Cadbury Committee commissioned by the London Stock
Exchange, in addition to Indian business leaders. 2'0 The Committee itself
also included a representative of a U.S. consulting firm and a professor
from the London Business School.21
The current version of Clause 49 also reflects the report of the Murthy
Committee. While this report did not explicitly cite to Anglo-American
models of governance, it was clearly a reaction to events in the United
States, particularly given the timing of the report, which followed just a few
months after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While the Murthy
Committee insisted that "corporate governance frameworks are not
exportable," and that India must find a model suited to its particular needs,
Clause 49 in its final form nonetheless echoes reforms in the United States
and the United Kingdom.2 12
The comparison below demonstrates striking similarities between
Clause 49 and the leading Anglo-American corporate governance standards,
in particular the Cadbury Report, the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, and Sarbanes-Oxley. The similarities (although not a
complete overlap) are particularly significant with respect to provisions
applicable to the board of directors, disclosure to shareholders, and internal
controls. While certain details differ, Clause 49 reflects a set of rules
dominated by concerns about the conduct of boards and protection of
shareholder rights. The Appendix summarizes the principal provisions of
Clause 49.
1. The Cadbury Report
In 199 1, the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange,
and the accounting profession formed the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance.21 3 Chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the
Committee considered board composition and responsibilities, the role and
composition of audit committees, as well as other issues relating to
208 BIRLA REPORT, supra note 155, §§ 1.1, 2.6.
209 Id. §§ 1.4, 2.6.
21 Id. §2.11.
211 Id. at Annexure 1 (noting Shri Rohit Bhagat of Boston Consulting Group and Dr.
Sumantra Ghoshal, Professor of Strategic Management, London Business School).
212 Id. § 2.6; MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, § 1.1.14.
213 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
app. 1 (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY REPORT].
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financial reporting and accountability.21 4 The Committee published a
report-the Cadbury Report-in December 1992, which contained
recommendations. The Cadbury Report, often touted as the first corporate
governance code of the modern era, has inspired corporate governance
codes worldwide. It is clear from a brief comparison of Clause 49 and the
Cadbury Report that there are significant similarities in the requirements
they each impose on companies, particularly with respect to provisions
applicable to the board of directors.
a. Board of Directors
The Cadbury Report and Clause 49 address general board matters in
addition to audit committee issues. While the two have a similar focus,
their specific provisions are not exactly in line. With respect to the board,
the Cadbury Report requires at least three nonexecutive directors, with a
recommendation that the majority of the nonexecutive directors -be
independent, but if the chairman is an executive, the board should have a
"strong and independent element.21 5 Clause 49, on the other hand,
requires a majority of nonexecutive directors and either a third or a majority
of independent directors depending on whether the chairman is also an
executive. While the Cadbury Report's board composition provisions are
to some extent more open-ended than Clause 49's provisions, the Cadbury
Report is also more general in its provision of broad recommendations for
board procedure and responsibilities. It advises on board dynamics, the role
and responsibilities of the chairman, the selection process for nonexecutive
directors, director training, and board procedure, among others. 21 7 Though
Clause 49 addresses other board issues such as number and timing of board
meetings, it does not address these broader provisions. The Cadbury Report
and Clause 49 are very similar in their provisions for audit committees. For
example, both require companies to form audit committees with a minimum
of three members and include independence requirements.21 8
b. Disclosure
While both Clause 49 and the Cadbury Report consistently encourage
disclosure, Clause 49 focuses on disclosure to a greater extent than the
214 Id.
215 Id. §§ 4.9, 4.12. The Cadbury Report's definition of independent is similar to Clause
49's, although far less detailed. Compare id. (outlining concepts of directors' financial
independence, but leaving to individual boards of directors the task of fully defining director
independence for a given company), with CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § I(A)(iii)
(enumerating six requirements for directors to be considered independent).
216 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, §§ I(A)(i)-(ii).
217 CADBURY REPORT, supra note 213, §§ 4.1-24.
218 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § II(A); CADBURY REPORT, supra note 213, § 4.35.
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Cadbury Report. The provisions of each nonetheless overlap in severalresp cts Bot .. 219
respects. Both require disclosure of director compensation. Under
Clause 49, companies must disclose and explain any deviation from
prescribed accounting standards; 220 under the Cadbury Report, companies
must state their compliance with the Report's requirements and disclose and
explain any deviation.221 Clause 49 also requires an MD&A section in a
company's annual financial reports. Though the Cadbury Report does not
explicitly require one, it discusses what might be seen as a precursor to the
MD&A-the chairman's opening statement of a company report.222 It
notes the statement is of "special importance" and should provide a
balanced summary of the company's performance and prospects, in
comparison to Clause 49's review of industry developments, risks,
performance, and opportunities.
c. Internal Controls
As with disclosure provisions, though Clause 49 goes into greater
detail regarding internal controls than the Cadbury Report, they nonetheless
overlap in significant respects. Specifically, both require internal control
certification. They differ, however, in the details. Clause 49 requires the
CEO and CFO to certify that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls, and that they have evaluated the effectiveness
of the control systems implemented.223 The Cadbury Report, on the other
hand, provides that the directors are responsible for implementing an
internal control system and certifying its effectiveness. 224 And while the
Cadbury Report stops at this point, Clause 49 goes on to require the CEO
and CFO to certify that they have reviewed the financial statement, that the
statement does not contain any untrue statement of material fact, and that
the statement fairly presents the company's financial position.
2. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
In 1999, the OECD released its Principles of Corporate Governance
(OECD Principles) in an effort to assist governments in improving and
evaluating the corporate governance framework of their country.22 5 Though
it recognized that "[t]here is no single model of good corporate
219 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § IV(E); CADBURYREPORT, supra note 213, § 4.4.
220 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § IV(B).
221 CADBURY REPORT, supra note 213, § 3.7.
222 Id., § 4.57.
223 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § V.
224 CADBURY REPORT, supra note 213, §§ 4.31-.32.
225 AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ORG. OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
& DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (1999), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id= 74229 [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES].
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governance," it identified common practices of its member countries that
underlie good corporate governance. 26 The scope of the OECD Principles,
however, is much broader than Clause 49. Most of its recommendations
deal with basic issues of corporate governance, such as protecting
shareholder rights, 227 treating shareholders equally, 228 basic principles of
229 bsc230('disclosure, and basic board responsibilities.. In contrast, Clause 49
contains detailed provisions for board and audit committee compositions
and internal control requirements.
Despite the OECD Principles' focus on fundamentals of corporate
governance, Clause 49 does echo some of the recommendations made in the
OECD Principles. Similarities are particularly evident in provisions
regarding the board of directors. For example, the OECD Principles require
disclosure of director remuneration. 231  In addition to reviewing general
board responsibilities, the OECD Principles encourage boards to assign
nonexecutive directors to financial reporting (audit), nomination, and
23
remuneration committees. 232 Clause 49 has similar requirements, though its
composition requirements are more specific.233 Similarly, the OECD
Principles require board members to devote sufficient time to their board
responsibilities, 234 while Clause 49 specifically limits the number of other' h 1"235
board positions a company's directors may hold .
The annotations to the OECD Principles highlight further similarities.
With respect to the audit committee composition and board responsibilities
provisions mentioned above, the annotations make clear that the OECD
Principles and Clause 49 are very similar. They explain that the board must
have a sufficient number of independent directors, and that audit
committees may require a minimum number of nonexecutive directors.236
They also raise the possibility of limiting the number of board positions a
226 Id. at 3.
227 Id. at 5 (giving shareholders the right to participate in decisions concerning
fundamental corporate changes, the right to participate in general shareholder meetings, and
the right to vote by proxy).
228 Id. at 6 (prohibiting insider trading and requiring directors to disclose conflicts of
interest).
229 Id. at 8 (requiring audited financials).
230 Id. at 9. For example, the OECD Principles require board members to "act on a fully
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence," and ensure compliance with applicable
law. Id.
231 OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 225, at 8.
232 Id. at 9.
233 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § I(A)(ii) (requiring that independent directors
compose two-thirds of the audit committee).
234 OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 225, at 22.
235 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § I(C)(ii).
236 OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 225, at 43.
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director can hold.237  In addition, the annotations to the Principles
233
recommend that MD&A sections be included in annual reports ,2  which
Clause 49 explicitly requires. 239  And while the Principles only require
annual audit by an independent auditor, the annotations suggest limitations
on non-audit income that auditors may receive from clients as well as the
establishment of audit committees and rotation of auditors.24°  Such
provisions are found in Clause 49, though again in more detail.
241
3. Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the United States in 2002 in the
wake of the Enron scandal, the collapse of the tech bubble, and the
WorldCom scandal. Although the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have been subject to harsh criticism in the United States, 242 many in India
view the Sarbanes-Oxley Act differently. Initially, at least, Indian
academics, accountants, and lawyers not only thought it was a fair and
appropriate law, but also looked to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a model of
corporate governance law that India should emulate. 243
As set forth below, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Clause 49 contain
many similar provisions, although they do not entirely overlap with respect
to the details of their various provisions. For example, although Clause 49
requires CEO/CFO certification of financial statements, it does not impose
criminal liability in the event of a misstatement. And while the provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as the code of ethics and corporate
governance guidelines, are echoed by Clause 49 provisions including the
code of conduct, this is not universally the case. The provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding auditing and accounting have no analogue in
Clause 49.
237 Id. at 44.
238 Id. at 38.
239 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § IV(F)(1).
240 OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 225, at 40.
241 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § II.
242 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CoRP. L. 1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521
(2005); see also Five years Under the Thumb, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2007; Stephen Labaton,
Will Reforms with Few Teeth Be Able to Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at B4. But see
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 987-88 (2003); Robert A. Prentice & David B.
Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received
Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007); D. Skylar Rosenbloom, Take It Slow: A Novel Concept in
the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2006).
243 Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes-Oxley: Can One Model Fit All?, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 20 (2006).
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a. Board of Directors
Both Clause 49 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focus on audit committee
issues, as well as other board matters. As discussed above, Clause 49 deals
extensively with board composition, imposing heightened independence
requirements on boards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Clause 49 even
define "independent director" similarly.144  Going beyond the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Clause 49 mandates the number of meetings per year and even
limits the number of directorships a director may simultaneously hold.
2 45
Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Clause 49 dealing with the
audit committee contain significant similarities. Both require public
companies to have audit committees, though the composition varies
slightly. 246 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires each member of
the committee to be independent, while Clause 49 specifies that the
committee have at least three directors and requires only two-thirds to be
independent.247 Both require at least one financial expert, though Clause 49
indicates all members must be at least financially literate.248
b. Disclosure
Disclosure provisions make up major sections of both the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and Clause 49.249 Nonetheless, the provisions largely diverge in
their content. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires disclosures regarding off-
balance-sheet transactions and pro forma figures.25°  It mandates
accelerated reporting of trading by directors, officers, and principal
stockholders. 25  Further, the SEC -must give an enhanced review of
244 Compare CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § I(A)(iii) (enumerating six requirements
for directors to be considered independent, with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (defining independence as "not receiving, other than for service on the board, any
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and as not being an
affiliated person of the issuer, or any subsidiary thereof.").
245 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § II(B).
246 Compare CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § II(A) (requiring two thirds of
committee members to be independent directors), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra
note 244, § 301 (requiring all committee members to be independent directors).
247 Compare CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § I(A)(iii), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, supra note 244, § 301.
248 Compare CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § II(A)(ii) (specifying "at least one
member shall have accounting or related financial management expertise"), with Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 244, § 407 (specifying company must disclose whether or
not, "and if not, the reasons therefore, the audit committee ... [has] at least one member who
is a financial expert.").
249 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, § IV; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note
244, at tit. IV.
250 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 244, § 401.
251 Id. §§ 402-403.
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periodic disclosures, and may formulate rules requiring real time
disclosure.252
Clause 49, on the other hand, focuses greater attention on disclosure to
the audit committee. It requires disclosure of related party transactions and
the use for any funding obtained through an IPO to the audit committee.253
Additionally, companies must disclose and explain any deviation from
prescribed accounting standards as well as nonexecutive director
compensation.254 Shareholders must also receive personal information
regarding new or reappointed directors.255
c. Internal Controls
In contrast to the divergent disclosure provisions, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and Clause 49 have similar internal control provisions. Both require
chief executive and financial officers to certify financial reports.256
Specifically, under both provisions the CEO and CFO must certify that they
have reviewed the statement, that the statement does not contain any untrue
statement of material fact, and that the statement fairly presents the
company's financial position. In addition, they must certify that they are
responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls, and that they
have evaluated the effectiveness of the control systems implemented.
The certification provisions diverge, however, in providing for
penalties for failure to certify. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides criminal
penalties, including fines of up to $5 million or twenty years in prison, for
willful misstatements.257 In addition, if a financial restatement is required
as a result of material noncompliance with financial requirements, the CEO
and CFO may have to disgorge bonuses and other incentive-based
compensation.'" Clause 49 does not provide criminal penalties for
certification misstatements.
C. Compliance and Enforcement: The Weak Links
Clause 49 of the standard listing agreement with India's stock
exchanges is a key component of India's "top-notch governance
framework. 259  However, compliance and enforcement with this
252 Id. §§ 408-409.
253 CLAUSE 49 (2004), supra note 191, §§ IV(A), (D).
254 Id. §§ IV(B), (E)(iii).
255 Id. § IV(G).
256 Id. § V; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 244, § 302.
257 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 244, § 906.
258 Id. § 304.
259 Joe Leahy, Corporate Governance: Sustained Growth Needs Better Company
Practices, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008 (quoting Manesh Patel, Partner, Ernst & Young),
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/762d26ac-c946-1 I dc-9807-000077b07658,dwp
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framework leave much to be desired. While many of the largest
independent public companies appeared to have little difficulty complying,
public sector and smaller companies have struggled to meet Clause 49's
requirements. Interestingly, SEBI's approach to enforcement is tempered
with experience; its broad initial threats of delisting evolved into a more
reasoned, focused approach. SEBI has initiated a number of recent
enforcement actions, with particular focus on PSUs; however, these
proceedings have so far been limited.
Moreover, the recent corporate governance scandal involving Satyam,
one of India's leading technology companies, will likely result in further
evaluation of Clause 49 and the compliance and enforcement mechanisms
currently in place.26° SEBI's current chairman has indicated in recent
speeches that he expects regulatory responses following the Satyam
scandal. 26' At this time, it is too early to tell what such responses will entail
and whether greater resources will be allocated to enforcement.
1. Gradual Implementation
The implementation of Clause 49 itself has taken place in stages. As
of March 31, 2001, the original Clause 49 went into effect for all companies
in the BSE 200, and all newly listed companies subsequent to that date,
pursuant to the recommendations of the Birla Committee.262 Compliance
requirements were extended on March 31, 2002 to cover all listed
companies with paid-up capital of Rs. 10 crore (100 million rupees, or
approximately $2.2 million) or a net worth of Rs. 25 crore (approximately
$5.5 million). Companies -with a paid-up capital of Rs. 3 crore
(approximately $750,000) were required to comply by March 31, 2003.263
On August 26, 2003, SEBI entered amendments to Clause 49 pursuant to
the recommendations of the Murthy Committee. The revised Clause 49
was planned to go into effect on March 31, 2004 for all companies that had
been previously required to comply with the original Clause 49, as well as
_uuid=56c2aff4-be8c-1 ldc-8c61-0000779fd2ac.html. See also Vikas Varma, Clause 49 Has
Finally Found Its Claws, LIVEMINT.COM, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.livemint.com/2007
/09/27143354/Clause-49-has-finally-found-it.html.
260 See Omkar Goswami, Aftermath OfSatyam, BusINESSWORLD (India), Jan. 23, 2009,
available at http://www.businessworld.in/index.php/Columns/Aftermath-Of-Satyam.html
(arguing that Indian regulators need "the teeth to enforce [existing laws and regulations] with
speed and decisiveness."); Prashant K Sahu, Sapna Dogra & Aditi Phadnis, Satyam Scam
Prompts Clause 49 Review, Bus. STANDARD, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news /satyam-scam-prompts-clause-49-review/05/05/346123/.
261 See Press Release, Confed'n of Indian Indus., No Knee Jerk Reaction in Satyam Issue
but Regulatory Responses can be Expected: C.B. Bhave, Chairman SEBI (Feb. 5, 2009),
available at http://cii.in/full-story.php?menu-id=78&newsid=2096.
262 MURTHY REPORT, supra note 167, at 35.
263 Id.
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for all companies subsequently seeking listing for the first time.264
However, this deadline was later pushed to January 1, 2006 after much
complaint that the implementation process was moving too fast for smaller
companies.
2. Compliance
While most recent figures indicate that large numbers of listed
companies are not Clause 49 compliant, the bulk of the problem appears to
rest with PSUs and smaller companies rather than top private sector firms.
As explored below, this is in part due to political pressures regarding the
PSUs and in part due to the traditional closed ownership structure of Indian
firms.
Clause 49 compliance is reported by listed companies themselves.
Under Clause 49, a quarterly report needs to be submitted to stock
exchanges within fifteen days from the close of quarter, which is required to
be signed by the CEO or the Compliance Officer.265 Moreover, the
company's annual report must contain a separate section on corporate
governance.
To date, companies listed on the NSE have more fully complied with
Clause 49 regulations than have BSE-listed companies. The NSE has
grown rapidly in the past year. On March 2007, 1228 companies were
listed in the capital market segment.266 In October 2007, this number had
267increased to 1327. As of October 31, 2008, 1623 securities were listed
for trading.268 According to the managing director of NSE, recent Clause
49 compliance data established that, as of October 2007, ninety-eight
percent of the then-NSE-listed companies were in compliance.269 It is not
clear how the NSE arrived at this conclusion. In fact, according to recent
data, approximately five percent of NSE-listed companied had not even
filed their Clause 49 required corporate governance reports as of March 31,
2008.270
The BSE's compliance outlook appears to be weaker than that of the
264 CLAUSE 49 (2003), supra note 13, at 13.
265 CLAUSE 49 (2004) supra note 191, § VI(ii).
266 NSE, LISTING OF SECURITIES 25, 30 (2007), available at http://nseindia.com
/content/us/fact2007_sec3.pdf.
267 M.C. Vaijayanthi, NSE Listed Firms Toe the CG Line, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Dec. 12,
2007, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=f775 1 b65-
84a 1-40a6-8dd6-8ef29d830851 &&Headline='NSE+listed+firms+toe+the+CG+ine.
2" NSE, About Us, Facts and Figures, http://nseindia.com/content/us/us-factsfigures.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
269 Vaijayanthi, supra note 267.
270 See NSE, List of Companies Which Have Not Submitted Corporate Governance




NSE. Various reports have indicated different compliance rates for BSE-
listed companies. According to one report, as of January 2007, 4143
companies were listed on BSE and were required to comply with Clause 49
regulations. 271 However, Clause 49 compliance stands at only forty-three
percent, with only 1789 companies in compliance.272 As of February 1,
2007, 2020 companies out of the 4149 companies listed on the BSE were
not Clause 49 compliant, according to Deepak Parekh, the Chairman of
SEBI's primary market advisory committee. 2  According to another set of
data, by March 2008 at least 1213, or approximately thirty percent, of the
companies on the BSE remained noncompliant.274
While the BSE overall noncompliance rate ranges from thirty to
around fifty percent, the numbers for top private sector companies appear to
paint a very different picture. In January 2006, when revisions to Clause 49
went into effect, the top ten private sector companies were all in
compliance. 75 By March 2007, only thirteen of the 204 BSE Group A
companies were noncompliant.27 6
In marked contrast to large private sector companies, PSUs were
mostly noncompliant with Clause 49 by large margins at the time it went
into effect. 277 And so they have remained; as recently as February 2008,
none of the listed PSU oil companies were Clause 49 compliant.2  The
overwhelming issue for PSUs has been Clause 49's independent director
requirements.279  In particular, SEBI has maintained that government
nominees on PSU boards are not independent per Clause 49's
requirements.280
271 More recently, as of December 2007, more than 4700 companies were listed on BSE.
BSE, Introduction, http://bseindia.com/about/introbse.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
272 R. Bijith, 57% BSE Cos Yet to Comply with Clause 49, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 2, 2007,
available at http://www.financialexpress.com/old/print.php?content-id=l 50610.
273 'Punish Cos for Clause 49 Non-Compliance,' Bus. LINE (MUMBAI), Feb. 20, 2007,
http://www.blonnet.com/2007/02/20/stories/2007022005030100.htm.
274 Corporate Filing & Dissemination System, Companies Not Complying with Clauses
49 & 40A, http://www.corpfiling.co.in/notcomplying/links.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
275 PSUs Fail SEBI's Clause 49 Test, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 10, 2006,
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe full-story.php?contentid=l 14055.
276 SEBI Proceeds Against 20 Cosfor Not Complying with Clause 49 Norms, HINDU Bus.
LINE, Sept. 12, 2007, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/09/12
/stories/20070912529301 00.htm.
277 PSUs Fail SEBI's Clause 49 Test, supra note 275.
278 Rakteem Katakey, Govt for 33% Independent Directors in Oil PSUs, Bus. STANDARD
(New Delhi), Feb. 18, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 3117239.
279 PSUs Fail SEBI's Clause 49 Test, supra note 275.
280 SEBI Cracks Whip on 20 Firms for Clause 49 Violation, Bus. STANDARD, Sept. 12,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 17748098.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:335 (2009)
3. Enforcement
India is not a country known for vigorous enforcement of legislation.
Thus far, the enforcement of Clause 49 has mirrored the lax enforcement
efforts of other major legislative reforms. There is little information
regarding enforcement of Clause 49 as SEBI has not provided much
disclosure to the public regarding these efforts. What is known, at least
with respect to large entities, is that there has been little use by SEBI of the
delisting enforcement measure provided under Clause 49, even for
companies that have failed to comply with Clause 49's board independence
rules.281 Similarly, the NCLT has failed to exercise its enforcement powers
with respect to corporate governance matters.282
Clause 49 contained certain penalty provisions for noncompliance.
While the initial penalty for failure to comply with Clause 49 was delisting,
severe financial penalties for directors of non-compliant firms were
introduced in 2004. Effective October 12, 2004, by virtue of the Securities
Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004, a defaulting company became liable for
monetary penalties under the provisions of Section 23E of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA), which provides that "[i]f a
company.., fails to comply with the listing conditions or delisting
conditions or grounds or commits a breach thereof; he shall be liable to a
penalty not exceeding twenty five crore rupees.' 283
a. Evolution of SEBI's Enforcement Philosophy
Not only has compliance with Clause 49 been weak, enforcement has
also been lacking. There is little enforcement of corporate governance
norms through private litigation. Despite India's sophisticated investor-
protection laws, litigants may never be able to meaningfully access the
courts.284 As the World Bank found in its 2005 report, "it is not unusual for
281 Balasubramanian et al., supra note 60, at 7, 14.
282 Id. at 23-24.
283 See The Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 § 11, No. 1, Acts of Parliament,
2005, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=200501; see also Dharmapala &
Khanna, supra note 61 (finding that a large and significant positive effect on the value of
firms as a result of the Clause 49 reforms and the 2004 sanctions).
284 The Companies Act states that it:
[C]onfers rights to shareholders in matters of oppression by the majority or
mismanagement. The lesser of 100 shareholders or those representing 10 percent
of shareholders can apply to the CLB for redress. CLB can instruct management
to buy out dissenting shareholders, terminate or modify agreements entered into by
the company or remove/appoint directors to the board. CLB's decisions may be
appealed to the high and supreme courts.
WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 115, at 6.
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the first hearing to take six years and the final decision up to 20 years.,
285
With the weak possibility of enforcement through the courts,
enforcement has essentially been relegated to the activities of SEBI.
Perhaps because it has observed the difficulties companies have had
complying with Clause 49, SEBI's enforcement philosophy has changed
since Clause 49's effective date. Early statements from Chairman
Damodaran indicated that SEBI would prosecute noncompliant companies
with enthusiasm; in fact, SEBI anticipated receiving compliance reports
from the stock exchanges within a month of Clause 49's effective date.286
Not only was it eager to track down noncompliant companies, but also it
seemed anxious to impose a severe penalty; Chairman Damodaran
threatened that SEBI was developing delisting standards while it waited for
the noncompliant list.
287
Within a few months of Clause 49's effective date, SEBI had toned
down its message. Although Chairman Damodaran was still calling for
tough action against noncompliant companies in April 2006, he maintained
that SEBI did not "want an adversarial relationship" with listed
companies. 288  Rather than calling for action against all noncompliant
companies, Damodaran suggested SEBI might investigate fifteen to twen9
and make examples of four or five of them to discourage noncompliance.
2 9
Furthermore, delisting is arguably not a particularly credible threat since
many listed companies-by some estimates eighty-five of listed
companies-have minimal trading of their stock.29°
By late 2006, SEBI's early eagerness appeared to further give way to a
more tempered approach to enforcement. In Damodaran's own words,
SEBI's "approach to implementation [would not be] that of a trigger-happy
kid., 291  Recognizing the potential harm to investors accompanying
delisting, he indicated SEBI would take a more cautious approach to meting
out such a severe penalty. 92 SEBI would focus its enforcement efforts on
those companies that possessed the means to comply, but that had failed to
285 Id.
28 SEBI Gets Tough with Corp Governance Defaulters, ECON. TIMES (INDIA), Jan. 11,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 538409.
287 Id.
288 Clause 49: SEBI Warns Erring Cos, HINDU Bus. LINE, Apr. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.blonnet.com/2006/04/08/stories/2006040804640 1 00.htm.
289 Id.
290 NATIONAL FOUNDATION, supra note 63, at 6.
291 'No Exemption from Clause 49 Compliance,' HINDU Bus. LINE, Aug. 30, 2006,
available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/08/3 I/stories/2006083103700900
.htm.
292 Id. (quoting Damodaran as saying, "[w]e cannot suspend or de-list companies from
the exchanges without having a closer look at the matter. SEBI, as market regulator, has the
primary objective of protecting investors.").
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take the necessary steps to do so, while companies that had made a good
faith effort to comply, but had fallen short, would be encouraged to
complete compliance rather than be prosecuted.293
While Damodaran has embraced a more tempered approach to
enforcement since Clause 49's effective date, whether SEBI will continue
with this philosophy is an open question. On February 18, 2008 C.B.
Bhave was appointed as SEBI's new chairman.294 As of yet, Chairman
Bhave has declined to comment on his future plans for enforcement of
Clause 49.295
b. Enforcement Actions to Date
SEBI brought its first enforcement actions in September 2007-years
after Clause 49 went into effect. 296  Although some view SEBI's
enforcement proceedings as evidence it has moved into "the next phase of
implementation and institutionalization of corporate governance norms in
India," many are less sanguine about Clause 49's overall effectiveness.297
As former Chairman Damodaran predicted over a year earlier, SEBI
brought adjudication proceedings against only twenty out of the hundreds
of noncompliant companies. 298 Though it did not disclose all of the names
of the companies, SEBI indicated fifteen were private companies and five
were PSUs. 299 All of the PSUs failed to meet Clause 49's independent
director requirements, while only three of the private sector companies
failed to comply with board, audit committee, and CEO/CFO certification
requirements.' ° ° This is unsurprising given the PSUs' overall failure to
appoint the required numbers of independent directors. 30 1 Three of the
private sector companies were noncompliant with almost all of Clause 49's
major provisions, and the remaining ten had failed to submit Clause 49
293 Id.
294 CB Bhave Takes Charge as SEBI Chairman, ECON. TIMES (INDIA), Feb. 18, 2008,
available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Markets/Indices/CBBhavetakes_
charge._asSEBIChairmanlarticleshow/2792714.cms.
295 Id. See also Bhave May Be New SEBI Chairman, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 14, 2008,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Bhave-may-be -newSEBIchairman/article
show/2780836.cms (describing Bhave's background and reputation for not bowing to
pressure).
296 Press Release, SEBI, SEBI Initiates Adjudication Proceedings Against 20 Companies
for Non-Compliance of Clause 49 Norms (Sept. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/press/2007/2007257.html.
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compliance reports to the stock exchanges.
30 2
In addition to adjudication proceedings, SEBI has also been enforcing
Clause 49 through blocking initial public offerings of companies not
meeting its requirements.30 3 Many of the noncompliant companies facing
IPO delay are PSUs without the requisite number of independent directors.
For example, India's second largest oil and gas exploration company, Oil
India Ltd. (OIL), did not have its IPO as planned in February 2008 due to
noncompliance. 304 SEBI has also delayed IPOs for the National
Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) and the Rural Electrification
Corporation, both of which were to have gone public in mid-2007, because
of issues regarding approval of independent directors.30 5
IV. CONVERGENCE UNFULFILLED
While the Clause 49 reforms at first appear to reflect convergence to
the Anglo-American model, a deeper look at the process leading to India's
sweeping corporate governance reforms and the implementation and
enforcement of those reforms demonstrate that such convergence is formal
at best. Despite efforts by India's corporate elite to shape and control the
corporate governance reform efforts, India's complicated politics have
continued to stymie such efforts. As argued by the Asian Corporate
Governance Association in 2007, India's corporate governance regime has306
remained weak despite enactment of Clause 49. There are numerous
factors that contribute to continuing weakness in India's corporate
governance regime.
This section examines the reasons for the flawed implementation and
enforcement process that proceeded from enactment of Clause 49. These
path dependent forces have prevented convergence to the Anglo-American
model from moving much beyond the formal level. This section discusses
the barriers to comprehensive convergence, focusing on interagency
struggles between SEBI and the MCA, the lingering concentrated
ownership structure of Indian firms, and the lack of public and private
institutional infrastructure to implement reforms. It then concludes with the
302 SEBI Proceeds Against 20 Cos, supra note 276.
303 Rakteem Katakey, OIL Share Offer Falters on Board Composition, Bus. STANDARD,
Jan. 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 631056; NHPC Public Offer in Danger for Non-
Compliance of Clause 49, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1378536.
304 Katakey, supra note 303.
305 Id.; NHPC Public Offer in Danger, supra note 303; Subhash Narayan & Niranjan
Bharati, Issue of Independent Directors Delay NHPC IPO, ECON. TIMES (INDIA), Feb. 2,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1949642. See also NHPC IPO Only Next Fiscal, Bus. LINE,
Feb. 20, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 3244494.
306 Asian Corporate Governance Association, Library, Country Snapshots, India,
http://www.aega-asia.org/content.cfm?SITECONTENTTYPEID= 1 &COUNTRY_ID
=264 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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ramifications of the Indian corporate governance experience for the
convergence debate.
A. Barriers to Convergence
1. Ramifications of Inter-Agency Struggles
Since the late 1990s the MCA has been engaged in what has been
termed a "turf war" with SEBI over the process for and substance of
corporate governance reform, among other things.3 °7 Many commentators
view the conflicts between SEBI and the MCA as a leading cause of lax
enforcement of corporate governance standards.30 8  Despite the relative
homogeneity of the Birla and Murthy Committees, criticism of the process
that culminated in the revisions of Clause 49 did not focus on the
committees themselves. Rather, one of the most significant issues with
respect to the reform process related to SEBI's conduct vis-A-vis the MCA
and SEBI's decision to pursue corporate governance reform through
amendments to the Listing Agreement, rather than through revisions to the
Companies Act with participation from the legislative branch.
One of the reasons that corporate governance reforms were pursued
through SEBI was that, as an independent market regulator, SEBI provided
some flexibility to a corporate governance regime primarily characterized
by a need for constant amendment of the Companies Act. The
promulgation of comprehensive reforms in the form of Clause 49
demonstrates this. Although SEBI has had long-standing tensions with the
MCA over who should be handling the various tasks involving reform and
enforcement of corporate governance standards, it is worth noting that since
SEBI's inception, it has taken significant steps to pursue formal
convergence with Anglo-American systems of governance through changes
to the Listing Agreement, while MCA's proposed reforms of the
Companies Act have languished in drafting and review.
Despite SEBI's ability to push Clause 49 through, the MCA's
resistance to its provisions, including recommendations by MCA-appointed
committees that conflicted with Clause 49, has significantly undermined
SEBI's authority and lifted much of the pressure from non-complying
companies. The "[l]ack of cooperation and coordination between key
307 Sucheta Dalal, Irani Panel Hasn't Helped Small Investors, FIN. EXPRESS, June 6,
2005, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/old/fe-fullstory.php?content-id=92958
(noting DCA and SEBI committees propose contradictory reforms; calling Irani
Committee's proposals "a direct snub to SEBI"); Mishra & Srivats, supra note 104.
308 Ambarish Mukherjee, Delayed Action Against Errant Co-Turf War Between SEBI
and DCA, HINDU Bus. LINE, July 16, 2001, available at http://www.hindu




government departments, in particular MCA and SEBI," further weakened
enforcement and implementation efforts, resulting in "overlap of
jurisdiction or regulatory gaps." 309 Furthermore, as argued by the ACGA,
India has "a penchant for setting up official committees and enacting new
regulations, but under-investing in enforcement and implementation.
Neither SEBI nor MCA seem [sic] to have enough competent staff who
truly understand the capital markets... it will be quite a while before
serious changes are seen."
' 310
2. Ownership Structures and Resistance to Reforms
Unlike the reaction to corporate governance reforms in other
developing countries, Clause 49 was not initially met with much resistance,
partly because of industry's leading role in the reform process. 311 Unlike
governance reforms in many countries that arise as a result of major
corporate scandals, the process of governance reforms in India was initiated
by industry leaders-in particular, the CII. Industry leaders were
particularly concerned with adopting governance reforms that could help
them attract investors-particularly foreign investors. Indeed, Indian
industry leaders have continued to work closely with the government in
promoting corporate governance reforms.312
Not only were industry leaders intricately involved in developing and
drafting India's corporate governance reforms, but investors also viewed the
Clause 49 reforms positively.313 In fact, what is shocking is how little
opposition there was to the corporate governance reforms initially proposed
through Clause 49. Despite the fact that the most active proponents of these
reforms were large firms who could more easily bear their implementation
costs, smaller firms voiced little opposition to the reforms.
Larger Indian firms in particular seemed to welcome Clause 49's
reforms because they appear to have benefited from the more robust
corporate governance rules imposed by Clause 49. In their event study of
the impact of Clause 49 reforms on the market value of Indian firms,
Professors Black and Khanna found a significant rise in the share price of
large firms following SEBI's initial announcement to adopt corporate
309 Asian Corporate Governance Association, supra note 306.
310 id.
311 See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Frangois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REv. 165 (2003).
312 In 2004, the MCA established the National Foundation for Corporate Governance
(NFCG) in partnership with Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Institute of Company
Secretaries of India (ICSI) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). See
National Foundation for Corporate Governance, About Us, http://www.nfcgindia.org
aboutus.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
313 Black & Khanna, supra note 11, at 18.
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governance reforms similar to those proposed by the CII. This result
reflected investor expectations that corporate governance reforms would
"increase the market values of larger Indian public firms." 31 4 Furthermore,
Professor Black and Khanna found that fast-growing and cross-listed firms
both reacted more positively than other firms, consistent with the theory
that "faster-growing firms are more likely to raise equity capital, and may
benefit more from the bonding to good governance" and "cross-listed firms




While large corporate entities have been relatively successful at
implementing Clause 49's reforms, PSUs and small- and medium-sized
enterprises have struggled with the implementation process. One of the
biggest failures of corporate governance reforms in India has been the
inability of corporate governance reforms to reach these entities. Many
experts believe that despite India's formal governance standards, the
"fundamental reality of Indian business-most are still controlled by family
shareholders" or are government-controlled-undermines the effectiveness
of these standards.316
There are several explanations for the compliance discrepancy between
top private sector companies and PSUs and smaller private companies. Top
private companies have a particular motive to be viewed as practicing good
corporate governance as they are competing for foreign direct
investment."' While top companies have strong incentives to increase
transparency and compliance, smaller private companies and PSUs have
faced many compliance obstacles. 3 8 The traditional closed or government-
controlled ownership structures of Indian firms have resulted in weak
boards and weak board practices. As identified by the World Bank, "a key
missing ingredient in India today is a strong focus on director
professionalism.
' 3 19
The closed ownership structure of Indian firms, along with significant
government control of large PSUs, has meant that there is little shareholder
activism in India, and investors spend little time communicating their
314 Id. at 1.
315 Id.
316 Leahy, supra note 259. See also Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 2002
Q.J. ECON. 121.
317 Varma, supra note 259.
318 'Punish Cosfor Clause 49 Non-Compliance,' supra note 273.
319 Michael F. Carter, Country Director, India, The World Bank Group, Address at the






concerns to the board of directors or the management of a firm.32° In India,
there are no significant shareholder associations, and minority shareholders
have minimal avenues for protecting their rights. Even large "institutional
investors show minimum involvement in corporate governance issues.,
321
The family business structure of many Indian firms compounds this
difficulty; family control can contribute to issues of adaptability and
transparency, and many family businesses do not have nomination
committees.3  In fact, one of the main concerns regarding Clause 49 has
been whether it can be effective given the structure of many Indian
businesses, where board members may be reluctant to question leaders of
family run businesses. For example, many argue that it is highly unlikely
that a board would ever oust leaders like Ratan Tata of the Tata Group. M
Thus, "family control... [raises] corporate governance concerns in areas
including adaptability, leadership transition, checks and balances and
transparency."
'124
The PSUs have also resisted reform. The PSUs have argued that their
non-compliance is due to the allegedly onerous independent director
requirements of Clause 49. According to many PSU leaders, while they
recognize the need for more independent directors, the process for
appointments takes significantly more time than private company
appointments because the government must appoint these directors.
35
SEBI Chairman M. Damodaran has suggested the government is dragging
its heels in appointing independent directors because it does not want to
326lose control over PSU companies.
Even the largest and most important PSUs have been in conflict with
SEBI and Clause 49's independent director requirements. For example, the
Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC), one of the PSUs against which it is
publicly known that SEBI has proceeded, has been the center of
controversy surrounding the strict enforcement of independent director
320 See Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate
Governance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from India, 1:3 INT'L REV. FIN. 161 (2000);
M.C. Vaijayanthi, Shareholder Activism, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=4b5beaf0-3847-47ad-994b-
38f92a294d22&&Headline=Shareholder+activism; C.V. Baxi, Grooming Independent
Directors to Be Change Agents, FIN. EXPRESS, June 25, 2005, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/old/fe full-story.php?contentid=94703.
321 Vaijayanthi, supra note 320.
322 Leahy, supra note 259.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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requirements. 327 Shortly after SEBI initiated the adjudication proceeding
against ONGC, the Ministry of Petroleum requested that SEBI drop the
proceedings, as well as the proceedings against two other oil PSUs.328
Petroleum Secretary M.S. Srinivasan assured SEBI that the companies
would have the required number of independent directors, but that
compliance would take "a little more time,' 329
Following SEBI's rejection of a compliance deadline extension and
reminder that penalties for noncompliance include delisting, ONGC
Chairman Sharma argued that Clause 49's independent director
requirements were unnecessary for PSUs. 330  According to Chairman
Sharma, because PSUs are highly regulated, accountability is higher and
Clause 49's requirement is therefore excessive. 331  The PSUs have
advocated that SEBI should instead enforce the J.J. Irani Committee on
Company Law's recommendation that only a third of their directors be
independent.
332
Sharma's argument provoked a harsh response from SEBI. Chairman
Damodaran refused to dilute Clause 49's requirements. 333  He was
particularly concerned that if people were investing in Indian companies
based on the perception that "Indian corporates are trying to get their act
together on corporate governance," Indian companies should follow
through on that perception.334
Despite outgoing Chairman Damodaran's response, the public reaction
from other PSU leaders has been agreement with Sharma. 335  Off the
327 Richa Mishra, ONGC Faces Threat of Delisting, HINDU Bus. LINE, Nov. 12, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 22305224.
328 Anupama Airy, Centre Tells SEBI to Drop Proceedings Against PSUs, FIN. EXPRESS,
Nov. 3, 2007, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Centre-tells-Sebi-to-drop-
proceedings-against-PSUs/235512/.
329 Id.
330 Mishra, supra note 327.
331 id.
332 K.R. Srivats, 'Independent Directors Should Form 1/3 ofBoard' Irani Panel Submits
Report on Company Law, HINDU Bus. LINE, June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.blonnet.com/2005/06/01/stories/2005060102690100.htm.
333 No Exemption for Listed PSUs on Independent Director Norms, HINDU Bus. LINE,
Jan. 3, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 93975. See also 'PSUs Must Meet Clause 49
Norms,' supra note 325 (noting Damodaran replied at a corporate governance conference
where Sharma was also speaking); SEBI Won't Budge on Clause 49 Norms, FIN. EXPRESS,
Jan. 2, 2008, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Sebi-wont-budge-on-
Clause-49-norms/257004/ (quoting Chairman Damodran as commenting that Sharma's
suggestion that "corporate governance requirement[s] should be less [stringent] for PSUs is
something I cannot persuade myself to agree with ...." and that "the solution should be
found elsewhere.").
334 No Exemption for Listed PSUs, supra note 333.
335 "PSUs Must Meet Clause 49 Norms', supra note 325.
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record, however, these leaders recognize the need for more independent
directors to ensure PSUs can compete effectively for capital.33 6
Nonetheless, since the announcement of Chairman Bhave's appointment,
the Petroleum Ministry has taken up Sharma's argument. 3 7 The MCA has
also indicated that it supports board composition of one-third independent
directors. 338  An oil company official has indicated his belief that the
proposal will carry more weight with SEBI's new chairman.339
3. Weaknesses of the Judiciary
While the formal codes and structures of Indian governance are highly
reflective of the U.S. and U.K. systems they have been modeled after, the
actual operations of those institutions, and of the judiciary in particular,
reflect distinctly local forces. As discussed in Part II.B.4 above, the Indian
judicial system is characterized by staggering delays in adjudication. The
delays in the Indian judiciary have meant that the corporate governance
reforms and measures to protect shareholders have generally not been
enforced through the courts.
In order to ameliorate the extreme backlog of corporate law cases and
to consolidate various duties previously allocated to several different
government bodies, in 2002, the Indian Parliament amended the judicial
structure with respect to corporate law matters. Under The Companies
(Second Amendment) Act, 2002 (2002 Act), the government created the
NCLT, along with its appellate body, the NCLAT, to enforce the provisions340
of the Companies Act. One of the government's hopes was that
corporate governance reforms could be enforced by this new judicial body.
Unfortunately, this judicial reform process has been stalled. On April
10, 2004, the Madras High Court declared the NCLT to be an
unconstitutional infringement upon the independence of the judiciary.34 1
The Madras High Court objected to several provisions of the 2002 Act
creating the tribunal, including provisions regarding expertise of technical
members of the tribunal, the three year term for tribunal members, and the
process of appointment of the president and chairman of the tribunal. 342 On
336 Id.
337 Katakey, supra note 278.
338 id.
339 Id.
340 The Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, supra note 117.
341 National Company Law Tribunal Held Unconstitutional, HINDU Bus. LINE, Apr. 11,
2004, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/04/11/stories/2004041101480
100.htm.
342 Id. The 2002 Act mandated that technical members of the tribunal would have 20
years experience in science, technology, banking, and other fields. However, the court felt
that experience in these diverse areas was no substitute to expertise in the particularities of
company law. The court also felt that the three year terms for members were too short, and
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May 18, 2007, the Supreme Court of India heard the petitioner's appeal.
Since the issues involved would have serious implications for the balance of
power between the branches of the Indian government, the case was given
to a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Court to decide.343 No final ruling
had been handed down as of March 2009, and thus far the NCLT has not
been established.344
B. Lessons for the Convergence Debate
The active debate regarding the extent of convergence between
different corporate governance systems has led to two polar positions: the
position arguing that convergence to the Anglo-American model is largely
complete and the opposing argument that political and path dependent
forces will limit convergence. A third important intermediate position is
taken by scholars who recognize that changes in formal standards, while
exhibiting one level of convergence, can be ineffective without an
infrastructure for implementation and enforcement.
This Article suggests that while a country can adopt formal rules that
move it towards an Anglo-American model, its convergence to this model
will be hampered by political and social forces. Formal rules will play an
important role in a country's overall governance system, but reforms cannot
be widely instituted without proper enforcement institutions and widespread
political support for reform. As demonstrated by the struggles between
SEBI and the MCA, and the weaknesses in India's judicial system, these
enforcement institutions are difficult to change.
India was well-poised to go down the path of formal corporate
governance convergence. The trajectory of India's corporate governance
reform efforts was shaped by India's vast economic growth and the
attempts of India's corporate elites to access new foreign and local capital.
These forces placed competitive and political pressures on the Indian
government to improve its formal corporate governance standards and to
develop legal rules based on Anglo-American corporate governance
discouraged competent people from joining. Although it was stipulated that members who
join the tribunal could maintain a lien on their jobs, the court felt that this was a cumbersome
way to conduct business. Finally, the 2002 Act provided that the president of the tribunal
and chairman of the appellate tribunal would be selected by a panel of secretaries, but the
court felt that, as officers performing essential judicial functions, they must be appointed by
the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the two most senior justices on the Supreme
Court.
343 SC Refers NCLT Issue to Constitutional Bench, ECON. TIMES (India), May 18, 2007,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/SCrefers NCLTissue-to-const
itutionalbench/articleshow/2059145.cms.
34 See, e.g., No Easy Cure for Industrial Sickness, ECON. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at 16,




practices. From decades of almost non-existent corporate governance,
India's current regime now exhibits some of the same formal governance
rules instituted in more developed economies. According to one influential
scholar of the Indian economy, "India is sort of a noisier version of the U.S.
system.1
345
Despite extensive governance rules, large numbers of companies have
been unable to comply with new governance standards and Indian
regulators have been slow, at best, to enforce these new standards.
According to a recent review of India's governance by the Asian Corporate
Governance Association, Indian enforcement and implementation of Clause
49 is, at best, weak: "Most mid- and small-cap companies do not see the
value of corporate governance. Most listed companies, including many
large ones, take merely a box-ticking approach. 34  A number of factors,
including regulatory competition between two government institutions, an
inefficient judicial system, and the sustained closed ownership structure of
Indian firms, have created barriers that prevent these robust formal rules
from being implemented and enforced.
India's reform efforts thus provide an interesting pattern of corporate
governance convergence for they can be characterized as either formal
convergence toward the Anglo-American governance practices, or as
continuing persistence of the traditional weak corporate governance norms
long-evident in India. Despite the initial exuberance about Clause 49 and
promises of rigorous enforcement, implementation and enforcement of
Clause 49 demonstrate that while formal convergence may have been
achieved, complete convergence requires greater institutional changes.
What are some of the lessons we can learn from India's corporate
governance experience and the ensuing enforcement and implementation
process? It becomes clear that even with attentive crafting of detailed
governance rules by a group of elites with a deep understanding of
corporate governance standards around the world, the reform process is
useless if an effective infrastructure for enforcement and implementation is
not in place. Thus, the corporate governance reform process must take
account of these limitations in the crafting of new standards. Convergence
cannot be complete with adoption of formal rules alone; true convergence
requires similarities in implementation and enforcement. 347  In fact,
introducing formal rules into a system where there is an inadequate
345 William J. Holstein, Corporate Governance in China and India, Bus. WK, Mar. 6,
2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/mar2008/ca2008036
_282896.htm.
346 See Asian Corporate Governance Association, supra note 306.
347 Gerard Hertig, Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement: A
Comparison, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 328 (Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., Cambridge University Press 2004).
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infrastructure to support the implementation and enforcement of such rules
may mean that these rules have little chance of succeeding.348 Moreover,
even if the infrastructure is in place, as the debates between SEBI and the
MCA illustrate, reform efforts are not likely to have a significant impact on
the country's governance norms unless there is cohesive political support
for them.
Undoubtedly the trajectory of India's corporate governance reforms
and whether complete convergence to the Anglo-American model will
occur will be shaped largely by local factors. 4  India's corporate
governance experience establishes that there are important political and
social factors that shape the evolution of a nation's corporate governance
system. These factors place such enormous pressures on countries that
convergence of different national systems in a single direction is unlikely to
happen in the near future, regardless of how well placed each national
system is to replicate one model of governance.
348 See William Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 98:2 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 95, 96 (2008).
341 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE




APPENDIX-AN OVERVIEW OF CLAUSE 49
Board of Directors:
Independence
* Requirement-fifty percent independent directors if Chairman
is an executive director or thirty-three percent if Chairman is a
non-executive.
* Definition-no material pecuniary relationship or transactions
with the company, its promoters, its management or its
subsidiaries, not related to Board or one level below Board and
no prior relationship with the Company for the last three years.
* Nominee Directors of Financial Institutions-considered
independent.
Board Requirements & Limitations
" Meet four times a year (maximum three months between
meetings).
* Director may be on at most ten committees and chair of at
most five.
* Code of Conduct (Ethics) required.
Audit Committee:
Composition
" At least three directors (two-thirds must be independent).
* All must be financially literate.
* At least one must have accounting or financial management
experience.
" Chairman of the committee should be an independent director,
who should be present at Annual General Meeting to answer
shareholder queries.
Audit Committee Role & Powers
* Minimum of four meetings per year (gap between meetings
not exceed four months).
* Broad role-review statutory and internal auditors as well as
internal audit function, oversee a company's financial
reporting process and quality of disclosure of financial
information, and review whistleblower program if one exists,
amongst other things.
* Powers to (i) investigate any activity within its terms of
reference; (ii) seek information from any employee; (iii) obtain
outside legal or other professional advice; and (iv) secure
attendance of outsiders with relevant expertise, if necessary.
Disclosures:
* Related party transactions.
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Disclosures (continued):
* Accounting treatments and departures.
* Risk management.
" Annual report includes a detailed chapter on Management
Discussion and Analysis, including a discussion on industry
structure and developments, opportunities and threats,
segment-wise or product-wise performance, outlook, risks and
concerns, internal control systems and their adequacy, relating
financial performance with operational performance, and
issues relating to human resource development.
* Proceeds from offerings.
" Compensation for directors (including non-executives) and
obtain shareholders' approval.
" Details of compliance history for last three years.
* Corporate governance reports (and disclose adoption, if any, of
mandatory and non-mandatory requirements). Noncompliance
with any mandatory recommendation with their reasons should
be specifically highlighted.
* For appointment or re-appointment of a director, shareholders
must be provided with the following information: (i) a brief
resume of the director; (ii) nature of his expertise in specific
functional areas; and (iii) companies in which he holds
directorships.
" Information like quarterly results, presentation made by
companies to analysts, etc., should be put on the company's
web-site and sent in such a form so as to enable the stock
exchange on which the company is listed to put it on its own
web-site.
Certifications:
* CEO & CFO: financial statements; effectiveness of internal
controls; legal transactions; and inform audit committee of any
significant changes in the above.
" Auditor or Company Secretary certifies compliance with
corporate governance.
Other Recommendations:
* Whistleblower policy is optional.
" Independent directors lose status as "independent" if served
nine years at company.
" Training board members.
• Evaluate non-executive board performance.
